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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the essential use of Multispectral Imagery (MSI) land remote
sensing data in support of future military operations, specifically naval operations. The
importance of proper management of the Landsat program and funding are discussed in
depth. Results of surveys from naval intelligence specialists and operators express the
interest of the Fleet in the need for MSI for future military operations. To continue its lead
in remote sensing systems, the U. S. must consider foreign competition, such as that from
the French Spot system. Examination of this competition, how the U. S. will cope with it,
and planning implications from the spread of MSI capabilities are discussed.






II. LANDSAT - THE FORMATIVE YEARS 5
A. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S INFLUENCE ON THE
LANDSAT PROGRAM 7
B. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S INFLUENCE ON THE
LANDSAT PROGRAM 8
C. LANDSAT - TROUBLED TIMES 10
D. LANDSAT 'S -4 AND -5 13
E. DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY ' 14
III. PREVIOUS MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY STUDIES 16
A. MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY 1982 - 1990 16
B. MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY DURING DESERT
SHIELD/STORM 19
C. NATIONAL SECURITY APPLICATIONS 21
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MULTISPECTRAL
REQUIREMENTS 2 2
E. DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY (DMA) REQUIREMENTS ... 23
1. High Resolution Imagery Requirements .... 23
F. MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL
APPLICATIONS 24
IV
MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY FOR MISSION PLANNING 25
IV. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY 2 7
A. AWARENESS OF MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY 2 8
B. AREAS OF PLANNING WITH MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY . 2 8
C. DISTRIBUTION OF MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY 32
D. OPERATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 3 3
E. OPTIMUM TIMELINESS 3 5
F. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS /RECOMMENDATIONS 3 6
V. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY 3 8
A. AWARENESS OF MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY 3 9
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR MSI IN PLANNING 3 9
C. DISTRIBUTION OF MSI TO THE FLEET 42
D. OPERATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 4 5
E. TIMELINESS OF MSI DISTRIBUTION 47
F. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS /RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
RESPONDENTS 4 9
VI. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR MULTISPECTRAL
IMAGERY? 50
A. LANDSAT 6 50
B. LANDSAT-7 52
1. National Landsat Policy Act of 1992 (Brown
Bill) 53
2. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992
v
(Pressler Bill) 55
3. National Space Policy Directive 5 (NSPD5)
( Land Remote Sensing Strategy ) 56
C. THE CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE (CIO) 5 9
D. CURRENT NAVAL USERS OF MULTI SPECTRAL IMAGERY . 6
E. COMMERCIAL VIABILITY OF LANDSAT 62
VII. FOREIGN COMPETITION 65
A. FRANCE - SPOT IMAGE 7
B. THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU) 7 3
C. JAPAN 7 4
D. EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY (ESA) 7 7
E. CANADA • 7 8
F. INDIA 78
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 80
APPENDIX A - MULTI SPECTRAL IMAGERY USER REQUIREMENTS
SURVEY 84
APPENDIX B - LANDSAT SPACECRAFT DATA SHEET 85
APPENDIX C - GROUND RECEIVING STATIONS FOR LANDSATS-4 AND
-5 86
APPENDIX D - TRACKING AND DATA RELAY SATELLITE SYSTEM . 87
vi
LIST OF REFERENCES




AN ESSENTIAL TOOL FOR TODAY'S NAVAL OPERATIONS
The use of Mult ispectral Imagery (MSI) from land remote
sensors, such as Landsat and Spot, is invaluable to support
planning for military and particularly, naval operations. The
advantages of MSI were effectively demonstrated to the
operations and intelligence communities when MSI products were
used in support of U. S. and allied forces deployed during
Operations Desert Shield/Storm.
This thesis examines MSI requirements for the future and
for management of the U. S. Landsat program.' Also discussed
is the effect that foreign competition and their growing MSI
capabilities could signify for U. S. national security.
Thesis research survey responses from naval intelligence
specialists and operators stress the increasing requirements
MSI information and suggest future uses. The most frequently
cited required use of MSI from these respondents was for near-
shore bathymetry and beach analysis. Interest was also
apparent in receipt of timely data. For MSI to be
incorporated into operational planning, the imagery data needs
to be received in near-real time. Concern also was expressed
that data dissemination be received at the lowest possible
level (ship of squadron) . Additionally, operational security
(OPSEC) was of some concern, but the respondents offered no
viii
feasible suggestions on what could be done to improve OPSEC
.
MSI-capable systems and information already are available
commercially worldwide, and the proliferation of foreign MSI
capable systems challenges the U. S.'s current advantage as
the leader in MSI capabilities. Countering this competition
through restrictions on proliferation is not a realistic
option. Instead, the U. S. must increase its commanders'
knowledge on available MSI data to deployed forces. In other
words, we must be wiser in our use of MSI data and
capabilities than any of our potential adversaries.
While Landsat capabilities have been available for 20
years, the program is still not on a steady course. Having
been bounced from one agency to another, including its current
management by the private sector, Landsat requires a permanent
home. This thesis explores agency options to manage the
Landsat program. The most recent plan, with NASA and DOD as
joint managers, is probably the most logical. Within DOD,
management of Landsat data through the Central Imagery Office
would be the most practical.
As Chapter VII on foreign competition points out, the
playing field for our military forces is no longer a one-sided
advantage to the U . S. To ensure national security
objectives, the U. S. must continue as the world leader in MSI
capabilities and applications, and we must realize the





A remote sensing capability such as is currently being
provided by Landsat satellites 4 and 5 benefits the civil
and national security interests of the United States and
makes contributions to the private sector which are in the
public interest. For these reasons, the United States
government will seek to maintain continuity of Landsat-
type data. (President Bush, 1992)
Remote sensing is essential to the support of national
security. It has supported military operations in ways that
other information has not, such as broad area coverage of the
Iraqi desert. While land remote sensing will be referred to
throughout this thesis, the term Multi-Spectral Imagery (MSI)
will be used more frequently. Land remote sensing refers to
satellite-based sensing of the earth, whether it be through
infra-red, thermal, or visual sensors. MSI refers to the
imagery data that is recovered from the land remote sensing
system. While it is recognized that MSI capabilities can be
placed aboard airborne platforms, such as aircraft, MSI, in
the context of this paper will refer to satellite-borne land
remote sensing data.
MSI, from the U. S.'s Landsat and France's SPOT systems,
was used extensively by the U. S. during the Gulf War in 1991.
The author understands the importance of MSI to support the
range of military operations, from non-combat evacuation (NEO)
and humanitarian assistance missions through combat missions,
and feels that the importance of this information needs to be
disseminated to operators who would benefit from its use.
During research and interviews for this thesis, it became
apparent that efforts concerning the use and future of MSI
have been put forth at all levels in Washington D. C, at
Naval Space Command (NAVSPACECOM) Dahlgren, VA, at Naval Space
Command Detachment (NAVSPACECOM DET) Colorado Springs, CO, and
at the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC) Quantico, VA.
However, it was also quite apparent during research that
operators and intelligence officers who would actually use
this information for planning, still knew very little about
MSI capabilities. These respondents had outstanding
suggestions on future requirements, dissemination, and
timeliness of MSI data. Although this paper just scratches
the surface of MSI, it is aimed at educating the Fleet about
its use and therefore should receive the widest possible
dissemination
.
Chapter II presents a brief overview on the development
of the Landsat program and a description of how land remote
sensing systems work. Chapter III is a summary of previous
studies on requirements for MSI for the Department of Defense
(DOD)
,
particularly for the Department of the Navy. Chapters
IV and V are studies of requirements for MSI from intelligence
officers and specialists, and operators, respectively. The
surveys 1 used for these chapters go beyond requirements and
1 See Appendix A for survey sample questions
include topics such as timeliness of dissemination, level of
distribution of MSI information and operational security
concerns . The same survey technique was used for both groups
to determine if responses would be similar or different.
Chapter VI is a discussion of the future of MSI capabilities,
particularly the U. S. 's remote sensing program and Landsats -
6 and -7 . The Brown^ and Pressler' Bills and their influence
on the Landsat program are discussed. The role of the new
Central Imagery Office (CIO) 4 and how it can meet DOD MSI
requirements and distribution needs is presented, as is how
various DOD agencies are using MSI . Interviews with personnel
working with MSI within DOD are included in this chapter.
Chapter VII discusses foreign remote sensing systems and the
seriousness of their likely impact on U. S. national security.
"'The National Landsat Policy Act of 1992, also known as the
Brown Bill, shifted oversight of the Landsat program from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to the
Department of Defense (DOD) and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) . The Bill also offered a two-tier pricing
system for the purchase of MSI data. This Bill is discussed in
more detail in Chapter VI.
^The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, also known as the
Pressler Bill, is similar to the Brown Bill. The major difference
being that Pressler proposed that all Landsat data be sold to
everyone at the same price. This Bill will be discussed further in
Chapter VI
.
4The CIO was established within the DOD to ensure that U. S.
Government "...intelligence, mapping, charting and geodesy and
other needs for imagery are met effectively and efficiently in a
manner conducive to national security..." (Cheney, 1992) See
Chapter VI for further discussion on the CIO.
Chapter VIII provides conclusions pertaining to the future of
MSI .
II. LANDSAT - THE FORMATIVE YEARS
In August 1959, the first space photograph of the earth
was transmitted by the Explorer 6 satellite (Geodynamics
,
1990) . Since then civil remote sensing has been relied upon
heavily to support science and industry (Geodynamics, 1990) .
The U. S. military is also coming to rely more on MSI remotely
sensed data for its operations.
In the early 1960 's, NASA and the Department of the
Interior (DOI) r began a cooperative program to study the
feasibility of launching a series of Earth Resources
Technology Satellites (ERTS). On 23 July 1972, ERTS-1 was
launched as the first unmanned satellite designed to conduct
remote sensing 6 by collecting earth resource data on a
^Originally, the Departments of Agriculture (DOA) and the
Interior (DOI) supported the creation of an Earth Resources
Observation Satellite (EROS) program to examine the global
environment through synoptic views of the earth. In 1968, the DOI
requested funding for an EROS program, but the Bureau of Budget
(now the Office of Management and Budget, OMB) denied the proposal
because the DOI was not authorized to conduct space programs. The
OMB did fund NASA to develop the program. Because NASA was
prohibited by law from handling the data distribution and services
necessary to support the proposed EROS program, a cooperative
NASA/DOI plan was devised, and funds were approved in 1969 (EOSAT,
May 1989)
.
^Remote sensing satellites detect electromagnetic energy from
the earth. Everything in the environment emits or reflects energy.
The intensity pattern of each object's emittance or reflectance
gives it a unique signature. This signature can also indicate the
object's density, surface texture, moisture and other physical and
chemical properties. By assigning arbitrary colors to different
systematic, repetitive, multispectral basis. ERTS-1 served
its experimental purpose and in January 1975, prior to the
launch of ERTS-B, NASA changed the name of the program from
ERTS to Landsat, 7 and ERTS-1 was renamed Landsat-1
(Geodynamics, 1990) .
Five Landsat satellites have been launched" with
Landsat 's-1, -2, and -3 having been decommissioned, and
Landsat ' s -4 and -5 already exceeding their operational life
expectancies (Geodynamics, 1990).
Landsat 's -1 and -2 were identically configured, with each
carrying a three-channel Return-Beam Vidicon (RBV) ' and a
four-channel Multispectral Scanner (MSS) 10 (Geodynamics,
1990), with a spatial resolution of 80 -meters (EOSAT, May,
frequencies, it is easier to obtain information on vegetation type,
mineral content of rock, or the sediment depositing in waterways.
(Hughes, 1992)
7ERTS was renamed Landsat to emphasize its utility for remote
sensing of land as opposed to the atmosphere and oceans
(Radzanowski, 1991) .
8See Appendix B for Landsat spacecraft details.
'The RBV is a f ramed-imaging device which acquires scenes
sequentially along the orbit track, recording electromagnetic
energy reflected from the earth's surface (Geodynamics, 1990).
10The MSS uses an oscillating mirror to scan the earth's
surface. A series of 24 detectors record solar energy reflected
from the ground and convert it into electronic signals, or digital
numbers (DN's) , representing brightness values (Geodynamics, 1990)
.
On Landsat ' s -1 and -2, the MSS collected data by recording
reflected light in four different spectral bands (Hughes, 1992).
Bands 4 and 5 correspond to the green and red visible regions,
while Bands 6 and 7 correspond to the near-infrared (IR) region
(Geodynamics, 1990) .
1989). A thermal IR band was added to the MSS on Landsat-3.
This band failed shortly after launch, so limited data was
acquired (Geodynamics , 1990).
A. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S INFLUENCE ON THE LANDSAT
PROGRAM
Throughout the 1970 's, NASA continued to operate the
Landsat program as high-tech experiments (EOSAT, Landsat '
s
Anniversary, 1992) .
In 1979, President Carter established a Space Policy
Review Board to provide a plan for development of the Landsat
program. Based on the Board's finding, President Carter
released Presidential Directive 54, which recommended the
following
:
• Transfer of Landsat operations from NASA to the NOAA,
because NASA is a research and development agency and not
an operational agency.
• Development of a long-term, operational system with four
additional satellites beyond Landsat -3
.
• Development of a plan for eventual transition of the
Landsat program to a private sector operation.
• Increased fiscal responsibility on the part of the data
users, to reflect the actual cost of system operations
rather than only materials/reproduction costs
(Radzanowski, 1991; and EOSAT, May 1989).
The private sector, under this Directive, was expected to
assume ultimate responsibility for operating the system once
a commercial market for the data developed (Radzanowski,
1991) . This was to be a phased process under Presidential
Directive 54, leading to commercialization in the 1992 time
period (EOSAT, Landsat ' s Anniversary, 1992).
B. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S INFLUENCE ON THE LANDSAT
PROGRAM
In 1981, President Reagan accelerated the
commercialization of the Landsat program when he authorized
the Civil Operational Remote Sensing Satellite Advisory
Committee (CORSSAC) , under the Department of Commerce (DOC)
,
to evaluate options related to commercializing the Landsat
program (Radzanowski , 1991; and EOSAT, Landsat ' s Anniversary,
1992). The Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade (CCCT) was
also asked to recommend options for Landsat commercialization
(Radzanowski, 1991). After deliberating on Landsat, CORSSAC
found among other things, the following, in November 1982:
The commercial market for Landsat data was underdeveloped
because the Government had an experimental program which
did not provide data operationally;
The government had no agenda to develop commercial markets
for the data;
At least two additional satellites beyond Landsat 5 would
be required to transition the program to operational
status;
Landsat 's -6 and -7 would have to be supported by the
government to develop the commercial market for the data;
Successful commercialization of the Landsat program should
be done gradually, so as not to adversely affect the
already developed commercial markets;
• Maintain an aggressive program of research in sensor and
platform technology to ensure U. S. leadership in the
world market
;
• The operational data sales from the weather satellites
could sustain the gradual commercialization of the Landsat
program;
• A lack of understanding of the public good of Landsat in
the executive branch at the OMB level, and above
(Radzanowksi, 1991) .
According to OMB, government support for the Landsat
program would end with Landsat-5, and funds for Landsat ' s -6
and -7 were cut in 1981 (EOSAT, May 1989). In 1983, OMB
instructed federal agencies to include budget requests for
Landsat data fees in their budgets (EOSAT, May 1989). Before
1983, U.S. government agencies had paid no fee or only a
reproduction fee for Landsat data products (EOSAT, May 1989) .
In early 1983 the CCCT recommended, as had CORSSAC, transfer
of both the Landsat program and operational weather satellites
to the private sector (Radzanowski , 1991). Under this
program, financial returns from the weather satellites were
expected to support Landsat costs until the program could
become self-sufficient (Radzanowski, 1991). Congress
disagreed with this proposal because it felt that with 95
percent of weather data used by government agencies, the
weather satellites lacked a private market sector
(Radzanowski, 1991) .
Congress did however, support the transfer of the Landsat
program to the private sector and in July 1984, passed the
Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act (P. L. 98-365)
(Radzanowski, 1991). The 1984 Act did the following:
• Authorized DOC to license private remote sensing space
systems that comply with the provisions of the Act;
• Required operators to make Landsat unenhanced data
available to all users on a nondiscriminatory basis. This
was an extension of existing U. S. "open skies" policy;
• Required DOC to maintain a government archive of land
remote sensing data (Radzanowski, 1991)
.
The Act provided for continuity of the Landsat program after
the Landsat-5 mission and the U. S. government would retain
ownership of all satellites and data from those satellites
(EOSAT, May 1989) .
The Reagan Administration's rejection of Presidential
Directive 54, which called for a gradual transition to a
private sector-operated program for the government, appears to
have been pushed well before the Landsat program was
financially secure in its future.
C. LANDSAT - TROUBLED TIMES
The Earth Observation Satellite (EOSAT) 11 Company won the
competitive bid for a 10-year contract to commercialize the
Landsat satellite remote sensing program and was subsequently
awarded the contract in September 1985 (EOSAT: Catalog of
n The EOSAT Company is headquartered in Lanham, Maryland and
was formed as a joint venture between Hughes Aircraft Company (now
owned by General Motors) and RCA (now owned by General Electric)
(EOSAT: Catalog of Products and Services; and Radzanowski, 1991).
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Products and Services) . EOSAT was originally responsible for
marketing and distributing existing Landsat data, operating
Landsat ' s -4 and -5 under contract to the government, and
building two new satellites (Landsat's -6 and -7), including
necessary ground systems (Radzanowski , 1991).
According to the contract, the government would continue
funding the operations of Landsat's -4 and -5 through their
life times, and would provide the satellite hardware and
ground systems for Landsat's -6 and -7 (EOSAT, May 1989) .
Because the market for remote sensing data was, in 1985,
considered underdeveloped, the U. S. government agreed to
provide $250 million over a five year period to subsidize
commercialization of the Landsat program (Radzanowski, 1991).
However, shortly after the contract signing, funding for
the development of Landsat's -6 and -7 was eliminated from the
federal budget. In a revised contract in April 1988, partial
funding was granted to restore continued Landsat-6
development. (EOSAT, May 1989)
Since 1985, the battle to subsidize and fund the Landsat
program has gone on between Congress, NOAA and EOSAT
(Radzanowski, 1991).
In 1988, NOAA had not anticipated Landsat's -4 and -5
operating beyond 1987 and pointed out that it had no
commitment to fund the Landsat program after Landsat's -4 and
-5 design life expired. Therefore NOAA did not request any
operations funding for the Landsat program for fiscal year
11
(FY) 1989. Subsequently, Congress appropriated funds for NOAA
to cover Landsat operations for the first half of 1989. In
early 1989 NOAA said that it had no funding available for
Landsat operations after 1 April 1989, and told EOSAT to turn
off the Landsat satellites. (Radzanowski , 1991)
Congress and the White House were concerned with the lack
of funding for the Landsat program, so the National Space
Council developed an interim funding plan in March 1989. The
plan allowed Landsat operations to continue through the end of
FY1989 by getting DOD, DOI , and DOA, all of whom use Landsat
data, to provide money to NOAA for the Landsat program.
(Radzanowski, 1991)
For FY1990 and 1991, NOAA again did not request any
funding in support of Landsat-4 and -5 operations. Again
Congress appropriated money for Landsat operations for the
first half of those two years, and agencies such as DOD, DOA,
DOI and NASA provided funds for the remainder of those years
(Radzanowski, 1991) . In 1992, National Space Policy Directive
5 (NSPD 5) 12 overturned the Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act of 1984 and directed NASA and DOD, along
with other government agencies, to realign the future of the
Landsat program.
12 See Chapter VI for further discussion of NSPD 5
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D. LANDSAT'S -4 AND -5
Landsat's -4 and -5 were launched in 1982 and 1984,
respectively and remarkably continue to operate today (EOSAT,
Landsat Spacecraft Data Sheet, 1991) . Both are equipped with
the MSS instrument, which was on the first three Landsat
satellites, and the Thematic Mapper (TM) 13 sensor (EOSAT
Landsat's Anniversary, 1992). Landsat's -4 and -5 have no
onboard tape recorders, and therefore all data collected must
be downlinked directly to one of 16 ground receiving stations
world-wide, 14 or relayed through the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System (TDRSS) 1 ' (Geodynamics , 1990). Landsat data
is either relayed through the TDRSS, or when the satellite
footprint is within range of the ground receiving station,
directly downlinked to the ground receiving station at White
Sands, New Mexico (Geodynamics, 1990) . From White Sands, the
l3TM is an advancement over the MSS, including higher image
resolution and more distinct spectral separation (Geodynamics,
1990) . TM uses a scanner mirror that rocks from side to side seven
times per second. By deflecting light from the ground into
detectors, the mirror scans the scene below in a series of parallel
swaths (Hughes, 1992) . The TM collects data simultaneously in
seven spectral bands (as opposed to four bands in the MSS) covering
portions of the visible; near-, mid-, and shortwave IR; and thermal
regions. Band 6, which is the thermal band, has a spatial
resolution of 120-meters, while the others have a spatial
resolution of 30-meters (Geodynamics, 1990).
14 See Appendix C for Landsat ground station coverage
1
-'TDRSS consists of three relay satellites in geostationary
orbits: TDRSS-4 (East), over the Atlantic Ocean off the northeast
coast of Brazil; TDRSS-3 (West) over the Pacific Ocean southwest of
Hawaii and east of the Gilbert Islands; and TDRSS-1, in a 79 degree
West orbit, where it serves as a backup to TDRSS-3 and -4
(Geodynamics, 1990). See Appendix D for an example of TDRSS.
13
data is retransmitted to Greenbelt, Maryland (Geodynamics
,
1990) . With EOSAT's new ground receiving station near Norman
Oklahoma, now open, Landsat data may be received there soon
(EOSAT, Spring 1992) .
Landsat TM and MSS data are available in two forms;
digital and photographic. Digital data is the most versatile
as it can be manipulated and analyzed by computer programs.
The use of digital data does, however require an investment of
equipment and trained personnel. All Landsat products are
corrected for radiometry and geometry. (EOSAT; Catalog of
Products and Services) DOD agencies are required however, to
order remote sensing data through the Defense Mapping Agency
(DMA) and not directly through EOSAT or SPOT.
E. DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY
As written in DOD Directive 5105.40, December 6, 1990,
Section D.15, the DMA shall "serve as the primary DOD action
office for all purchases of Land Remote Sensing Satellite
(Landsat) and Systems Probatoire d ' Observation de la Terre
(SPOT) remote sensing data by the Military Departments and
Defense Agencies." (Atwood, 1990). Additionally, section E.2
states that "the Secretaries of the Military Departments,
Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, and Heads of
other DOD components shall:" among other things, "Submit all
requirements and provide funding to the DMA for Landsat and
Spot remote sensing data (Atwood, 1990)
.
14
Procurement of remote sensing data through DMA for DOD
agencies was originally established because DMA was using the
data to update maps and charts. DMA was ordering so much data
that it was believed that DMA would be a good go-between for
DOD and the remote sensing companies, and that way no one in
the private sector would know what DOD was ordering (Lesher,
1992) .
Now may be the time to reevaluate the value of DOD
procurement of Landsat through DMA. With military
requirements for MSI increasing, there may be a more efficient
manner of acquiring data. The soon to be established Central
Imagery Office (CIO) 1 ' should play a key role in data
acquisition for DOD.
See Chapter VI on discussion of the CIO
15
III. PREVIOUS MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY STUDIES
Continued availability of LANDSAT-type remote sensing
information is essential to satisfy a special set of DOD
mission requirements. 1989 DOD position (Landsat
Background and Policy Brief, 1992)
A. MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY 1982 - 1990
Department of Defense interest in MSI began in July 1982,
when representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
visited NASA facilities for a demonstration of the Landsat
products. NASA provided DIA a digital image processing system
and assisted in training DIA personnel on the use of the
equipment. At that time, members of the Intelligence
Community were asked to participate in a DIA-chaired working
group that would investigate future multispectral and
multisensor exploitation techniques. In November 1982 the
DIA-chaired Multispectral Analysis Working Group (MAWG) held
its first meeting. The goal of the group was to keep abreast
of future developments in digital image collection,
processing, and analysis. (Geodynamics , 1990)
As a result of the interest generated by the MAWG, DIA
sponsored two studies. The first, Multispectral Imagery
Analysis - Opportunities for Defense Intelligence
,
December
1983, reviewed civil foreign and domestic imaging systems and
assessed their potential to answer intelligence requirements.
The second, Multispectral Cueing Study , December 1984,
16
examined the use of a multi spectral system to generate cues by
applying automated change detection. (Geodynamics , 1990)
The Multispectral Requirements Evaluation Group (MREG) was
formed under the auspices of the Intelligence Community Staff
and chaired by DIA. The purpose of this group was to evaluate
potential applications of MSI to Intelligence Community
information needs. The MREG final report, Multispectral
Imagery Requirements , May 1984, identified a wide range of
needs that could be satisfied by MSI. (Geodynamics, 1990)
MREG-II was formed in 1985 to evaluate the capabilities of
collection systems and to determine which system or
combination of systems could satisfy the requirements
identified by MREG-1. The final report, Collection Systems
Capability to Satisfy Multispectral Imagery Requirements
,
September 1985, identified a range of requirements that could
be satisfied by current and programmed systems, and a second
group of requirements that would require new or modified
systems. (Geodynamics, 1990)
The Tactical and Military Multispectral Requirements
Evaluation Group (TaMMREG) was established in September 1985
under DIA and Secretary of the Air Force sponsorship. It was
formed in response to the military, specifically the
Intelligence Community's need to determine how commercial
multispectral remote sensing systems could satisfy tactical
and general military requirements. (Geodynamics, 1990)
During 1986 and 1987, TaMMREG supported eight military
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exercises. The results of these exercises and other 1986 and
1987 TaMMREG activities are documented in Mul t ispectral
Application - A Significant New Resource for Warfiqhtinq
Planning and Execution , January 1988. Analysis of the
evaluations supported the following conclusions:
• Mult ispectral data adds a unique quality to enhance
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB);
• The sooner the data is introduced in the planning stages,
the better the use;
• Exposure and experience are the key to field exploitation
of the asset;
• Considerable planning is needed when placing rnul tispectral
image processing equipment into the field for exploitation
purposes (Geodynamics , 1990).
In 1986, Naval Space Command (NAVSPACECOM) initiated its
Naval Multispectral Applications and Requirements Study
(NMARS) (Bonner, Miller, and Rowan, 1992), which was published
in December 1987 and which identified potential applications
of MSI to operational forces afloat and ashore (Geodynamics,
1990) . Although this study encompassed both Fleet and Fleet
Marine Force units, it was not the official position of both
services (Bonner, et al, 1992).
As a result of the NMARS, the services acquired and
installed MSI processing systems at the following commands for
test-beds
:
I MEF - 1st Topographic Platoon;
II MEF - 2nd Topographic Platoon;
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• III MEF - 3rd Topographic Platoon;
• Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC) , now JICPAC;
• Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic
(FICEURLANT) , now Atlantic Intelligence Center (AIC)
(Geodynamics, 1990) .
These systems were state-of-the-art 386 personal computer's
(PC's), with MSI software, data input, and hard copy
generation capabilities, which were to be utilized for testing
and evaluation. Limited training was provided to the sailors
and marines who would be required to exploit MSI using these
systems. (Bonner, et al, 1992) In fact no training was
received by future analysts at FICPAC (Wilcox, 1992).
A Naval MSI Evaluation Project (NMEP) was initiated in
1988 to address some of the recommendations of the NMARS
(Geodynamics, 1990) . As of April 1990, the NMEP had provided
a limited quantity of raw data and value-added products to
Navy and Marine Corps requestors, and was establishing a basic
MSI softcopy exploitation capability for FICPAC and
FICEURLANT. A database has been established to track all
requests submitted under this program along with an associated
inventory of all MSI data procured. The NMEP is coordinated
through the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Imagery
Planning Group (Geodynamics, 1990)
.
B. MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY DURING DESERT SHIELD/STORM
In August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the naval
service was not yet ready to fully exploit MSI in support of
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our warfighters. As a result, the MSI capability was utilized
in a spotty and sometimes disorganized manner during Desert
Shield/Storm. (Bonner, et al, 1992)
MSI did, however, provide a number of excellent products
in support of Desert Shield/Storm. The Army Space Command,
Army Space Institute, and Engineering Topographic Laboratories
contributed knowledge, skill, and training to their forces,
developing and delivering numerous MSI based maps and images
to their deployed forces (Bonner et al, 1992)
.
"FICPAC developed and distributed an excellent suite of
image products in support of the initial deployment of Navy
and Marine forces" (Bonner et al, 1992), and continued that
support throughout Desert Shield/Storm with updates.
FICPAC was probably the most successful naval intelligence
center in its use of MSI, during Desert Shield/Storm (Wilcox,
1992) . FICPAC would not have been capable of this support
except that two personnel at the command had some on-the-job
training and experience in MSI analysis. One was the Division
Officer, who had received on-the-job training when lie worked
in industry, and the other was a Marine Gunnery Sergeant who,
through his own initiative, taught himself about MSI on the
system at FICPAC.
Soft copy MSI was also used for mission planning for air
crews. Marine Air Group 11 (MAG 11) and MAG 13 acquired and
utilized MSI soft copy merged with Digital Terrain Elevation
Data (DTED) from DMA (Bonner et al, 1992). This data was
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exploited on a computerized, interactive mission rehearsal
system, allowing pilots to fly their mission on the computer
while viewing a three-dimensional display of what they would
be seeing during ingress and egress (Bonner et al, 1992) .
Because of the lack of trained personnel, the marines from
the Topographic Platoons of I, II, and III MEF, did not use
their MSI-capable systems during Desert Shield/Storm (Barile,
1992) .
With outstanding successes and a few failures of products
and imagery derived information from MSI during Desert
Shield/Storm, MSI is currently being given much more
attention. While MSI obviously has supported national
security concerns, it also supports civil and commercial
concerns
.
C. NATIONAL SECURITY APPLICATIONS
MSI supports national security applications in the
following areas:
• Military planning and targeting traf f icability/mobility
analysis; ingress/egress route planning; materials
identification
• Support to U. S. operational forces activity
indi cat ion /camouflage detection
• Broad area search - change detection
• Counternarcotics airstrip/lines of communications
detection; illicit crop detection/yield estimation
• Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) terrain
categorization; near-shore bathymetry; image maps
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• Strategic resource production and environmental impacts
• Military-industrial production
• Catastrophe/disaster relief
• Treaty verification/proliferation (Landsat Background and
Policy Brief, 1992)
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MULTISPECTRAL REQUIREMENTS
The following are requirements for MSI, compiled from
Unified and Specified Commands, the different Armed Services,
and DOD Science and Technology Intelligence Center
submissions. Some commands determined that more than one
category was important, so the total does not equal 100
percent . The responses were grouped as percentages and so
appear that way:
Planning and current operations 36%
Targeting 18%
MC&G - including hydrography 16%
Defense-related Science and Technology/Industry 70%
Counternarcotics 16%
Treaty monitoring and nuclear proliferation 7%
(Landsat Background and Policy Brief, 1992)
DOD MSI requirements also include various spatial
resolutions of the imagery depending on the information that
will be derived from the imagery. While spatial resolution
requirements range from 0.3 - 3 meters (Landsat Background
and Policy Brief, 1992), future designers of MSI-capable
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systems must keep in mind that one of the main attributes of
the current MSI-capable systems, particularly Landsat, is its
broad area coverage. High spatial resolution on future
systems should not be at the expense of broad area coverage.
E. DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY (DMA) REQUIREMENTS
DMA and current Landsat capabilities for selected
characteristics are compared as follows:
CHARACTERISTIC DMA REQUIREMENT CURRENT Landsat
• Resolution 3-5 meters 30 meters
• Stereoscopic Coverage Yes None
• Metric Data:
Positioning Data GPS None
Orientation Data Star Sensors None
(Landsat Background and Policy Brief, 1992)
1. High Resolution Imagery Requirements
The following are examples of features that require
high resolution imagery for identification and attribution to
satisfy military requirements:
• Lineal - fences, power lines, hedge rows
• Aerial - dry dock, buildings, bridges, mobile home parks
• Point features - towers, flare pipes, tunnel tubes, wells
• Others - ferry crossings, buoys, anchorage, reef, springs,
caves, culverts (Landsat Background and Policy Brief,
1992) .
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Again, it must be stressed that high resolution of MSI
imagery must not be designed into the system at the expense of
broad area coverage. There are other systems and capabilities
that can be used for point targeting, with tunnel vision, and
we must be aware that high spatial resolution should not
replace broad area coverage of future MSI systems. The broad
area coverage capabilities of Landsat is too valuable to lose
on current or future systems.
F. MULTI SPECTRAL IMAGERY CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS
MSI has been supporting civil and commercial activities
for quite some time. As we become more involved in
humanitarian assistance and other "non-military" activities,
the military may look to MSI for non-traditional military
uses. Meanwhile, MSI continues to be used to support the
following major categories of civil and commercial
applications :
Environmental monitoring - disaster assessment, oil
spills, deforestation, forest fires, flood damage
Agriculture - famine relief, crop disease
Forestry - timber management, change detection, acreage
statist ics
Land use - water usage patterns, dry land agriculture
Regional planning - encroachment monitoring, drainage
patterns, transportation corridors
Mapping - remote area mapping, map updates
Geology - mineral detection, earthquake damage assessment
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• Water resources - flood plains, irrigation
• Oceanography - bathymetry, thermal (Landsat Background and
Policy Brief, 1992; and Marine Corps Intelligence Center,
1992) .
G. MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY FOR MISSION PLANNING
A survey was conducted by the Cruise Missiles Project
Office to determine the applicability of MSI to mission
planning for cruise missiles. According to the survey results
of 18 October 1991, the utilization of MSI from commercially
available satellites as a data source was a system requirement
of the Digital Imagery Workstation Suite (DIWS) . DIWS should
be capable of using MSI as a broad area search tool for the
identification of ground areas, which might be considered
suitable as Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator (DSMAC)
scenes. MSI was evaluated by the Naval Avionics Center (NAC)
,
as a "first look" tool for analyzing the entire target area
and categorizing ground features which might be considered
suitable for DSMAC scenes. MSI would be used as a preplanning
tool to conserve time in higher resolution imagery tasking and
to expedite DSMAC scene preparation. (Smith, 1991)
This study indicated that MSI has "excellent potential for
use in this specific mission planning application." Further,
the study results "highly recommended that the capability to
utilize MSI as a data source be incorporated in the DIWS
system for the expedition of cruise missile mission planning."
(Smith, 1991)
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Many studies, evaluations, tests, and exercises, as well
as actual combat applications, have been conducted with MSI.
The consensus from all these uses is that MSI is a system that
continues to offer excellent potential for support of our
armed forces, as well as civil and commercial applications.
Chapters IV and V offer additional results on surveys
conducted by the author. Many of the ideas for MSI
applications are the same as those expressed in this chapter.
However, additional information, such as timeliness of
dissemination and operational security are explored through
the responses of operators and intelligence specialists.
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IV. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY
On 5 May 1992, a survey 17 of user requirements for MSI
was conducted of the CNO Tactical Development and Evaluation
Conference, to determine operators' use and interest in MSI
information and capabilities. Results of the 21 survey
responses reflected the varying function and focus of the
commands represented, including: COMSIXTHFLT, COMTHIRDFLT,
COMCRUDESGRU FIVE, COMSURFWARDEVGRU, COMSUBDEVRON TWELVE,
COMNAVAIRLANT, COMCARGRU SEVEN, AIRDEVRON ONE, and AIRDEVRON
FIVE. Some commands were represented by more than one person,
so that command may appear more often than others in the
response section.
The survey was conducted to determine: 1) If the
respondent was previously aware of MSI capabilities and
implications; 2) In what areas of planning the respondent
would like to see a more extensive use of MSI; what the
respondent would like MSI to do for them; 3) What the
respondent views as the most desirable distribution of MSI
products and information; 4) What the respondent views as
operational security concerns, if a potential enemy can access
and exploit information from the commercially available MSI
products; 5) What the respondent considers to be the optimum
17 See Appendix A for survey sample questions
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timeliness in receiving MSI products; monthly updates; daily
updates, contingency-driven updates; 6) Additional
Comments /Recommendations regarding MSI. Responses will be
discussed in this chapter.
A. AWARENESS OF MULTI SPECTRAL IMAGERY
Of the 21 respondents, 29 percent had no previous
knowledge of MSI. While 71 percent knew something about MSI,
the majority appeared to know very little about its
capabilities and implications. The questions about MSI
capabilities and the responses to these surveys were
encouraging and demonstrated that there is an immense interest
in MSI by operators. Unfortunately, while many commands and
personnel have worked with MSI, it is apparent that the
information has not been widely distributed to Fleet users.
B. AREAS OF PLANNING WITH MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY
The majority of respondents were interested in more
extensive use of MSI for shallow water mapping of coastal
areas (Boyd, Farrell, Giambast iani , 1992) . For naval forces
this will probably be the greatest area of use, especially if
bathymetric measurements can be used in the future and are
accurate. The study of ocean fronts and eddy analysis
(Talipsky, 1992), evaluation of water depth, bottom type and
topography such as sand, coral and rocks (Boyd, 1992) were all
suggested as requirements for MSI. These analyses could all
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support contingency planning for Non-combatant Evacuation
Operations (NEO) and combatant amphibious operations in the
future. While no Special Forces, such as Sea-Air-Land (SEAL)
Team members , were included in the surveys, these forces could
greatly benefit from the information gained from shallov; water
MSI data. Water depth and type of beach floor, as well as
determination of vegetation along a beach, are all information
that can be gleaned from MSI data. Instead of risking lives
to scout out an area for a beach landing, land remote sensing
systems, which are suited to this type of data gathering,
could be utilized. Inshore warfare support teams could also
benefit from MSI-derived information.
Interest in shallov; water mapping in support of Anti-
submarine Warfare (ASW) and determining shallov; water
submarine operating areas were also of interest (Dodsworth,
1992) mainly to the P-3 community. Respondents from the P-3
community expressed a desire for this capability, but other
ASW communities such as S-3's, H-3's, and SH60's could most
certainly benefit as well.
One respondent suggested that anti-mine warfare, which has
always been and continues to be a problem for U. S. forces,
would also benefit from shallow water mapping (Dodsworth,
1992) . Perhaps, mapping of coastal areas could indicate where
potential enemies may place mines and help to determine where
the U. S. should initially conduct mine clearing or laying
operations .
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Targeting, strike planning, mission planning, target
placement and density of target, and target movement concern
the strike aviation community (Cetow, Ogle, Talipsky, 1992).
MSI is currently being used for broad area coverage of strike
targets so the pilot can get a sense of the overall target
area. Landsat resolution currently is not as detailed as
other imagery information for target specific planning. Broad
area coverage does however, provide information for overall
target area or for movement of large amounts of troops, such
as across the desert during Desert Shield/Storm.
Strike Rescue or Search and Rescue (SAR) planning were
also suggested as requirements of MSI (Dodsworth, Nosenzo,
1992) . Unfortunately, planning with MSI would have to be
accomplished well in advance of any type of rescue, because of
lack of timeliness of current systems. This would present
problems though since most SAR should be completed within 3
minutes for increased likelihood of successful operations.
Additionally, threat avoidance and detection of Surface-
to-Air Missile (SAM) sites are of interest (Nosenzo, 1992).
The concerns again are, can MSI exploit this in a near-real
time effort and how timely is the information?
Detection of SCUD land sites and SCUD launchers has become
a greater concern (Talipsky, 1992), considering the smaller
developing countries we will probably be engaging in the
future. MSI was used as broad area coverage to locate SCUD
sites in Iraq (Barile, 1992). Concurrent with this thesis
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being written, a classmate at the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) is researching mobile SCUD detection. 18 Unfortunately,
he has found that MSI was applied late in the detection of
mobile SCUD ' s during Desert Storm and its effectiveness has
not yet been determined (Greenwood, 1992)
.
COMSIXTHFLT was interested in the use of MSI for
counternarcot ics operations, specifically the use of port
imagery to determine the presence or absence of suspect ships
(Talipsky, 1992) . MSI can also be used to identify crops and
help drug eradication efforts by determine where various crops
are grown
.
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) environmental planning
was another suggested use for MSI (Talipsky, 1992) .
Indications and Warnings (I & W) is an area in which one
respondent said he would like to see more use of MSI (Tandy,
1992) . Perhaps a more timely system in the future will give
us greater possibility of use of Landsat and Spot for I & W,
but the systems are not timely enough now.
Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS) and
Tactical EA-6B Mission Support System (TEAMS) integration were
also suggested (Nosenzo, 1992). Merging MSI with these
systems would give pilots an extremely efficient
ingress/egress planning system.
18The title of the thesis is Countering Mobile SRBM Threats
Lessons Learned from the Gulf War , by LT Michael D. Greenwood.
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COMNAVAIRLANT indicated that Battle Damage Assessment
(BDA) capabilities would be a valuable use of MSI (Ogle,
1992) . For large targets and complete destruction this may be
feasible, but point target weapon delivery and destruction may
be difficult to determine.
All this interest in MSI indicates the potential value of
the product. Unfortunately, it also indicates some
misperceptions of how it currently can be used.
C. DISTRIBUTION OF MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY
The majority of respondents expressed an interest in
distribution of MSI products or information to the user level
aboard individual ships or with individual squadrons (Cetow,
Dodsworth, Fuller, Kinnane, Nosenzo, Parmenter, 1992).
Answers as to the level of distribution varied with the combat
situation, whether it was peacetime or whether we were
involved in a conflict. For instance one respondent indicated
that MSI should be distributed to the national intelligence
centers during peacetime and to the Joint Task Force (JTF)
during crisis (Tyler, 1992) . One problem with this concept is
if we are going to train the way we fight, then the MSI
products and information need to be distributed to the user
during peacetime as well as in wartime.
Other respondents suggested distributing MSI products to
Carrier Air Group (CAG) intelligence officers, who then would
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distribute the information down the chain of command (Farrell.
Schneider, 1992) .
Distribution of MSI data to Battle Group Commanders was
second to individual users receiving MSI (Ogle, Talipsky,
Vaughan, 1992) . While this goes a long way in getting the
information to the Fleet, MSI products would be better
utilized if the user, the intelligence officer or targeteer,
were the direct recipient.
Some respondents felt that Numbered Fleet Commanders would
benefit the most by receiving the information or products
(Boyd, Talipsky, Watras, 1992). While MSI may be useful to
these commanders, the intelligence officers and targeteers
need the information as well.
D. OPERATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
This should be one of the most important concerns to the
U. S. While Landsat and Spot information are available to
anyone, anywhere in the world, we need to be aware that the
information gained by others, especially potential
adversaries, could be used against us. Our potential
adversaries will likely be collecting information about us,
while we are collecting information about them.
Some respondents indicated that our potential enemies will
know information about us that we might not want them to know,
and that coverage cannot be denied them (Boyd, Tyler, 1992).
Additionally, concern for improved resolution and timeliness
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could present problems if enough real-time data is available
to our potential adversaries. The COMSURFWARDEVGRU respondent
mentioned that if the imagery product is timely and can permit
picking out ships in "mid-ocean through wake patterns," then
access to Landsat or Spot by potential adversaries poses a
greater threat than if the imagery received can determine "two
weeks after the fact that the Norfolk piers are empty."
(Roberts, 1992)
To counter our enemy's ability to gain access to MSI
products, it was suggested that allied countermeasures be
developed to deny a potential enemy access during a crisis
period (Watras, 1992) . This was practiced with Spot and
Landsat data during Desert Storm. Another recommendation to
discourage a potential adversary from gaining access to MSI
products and information about the U. S. could include some
type of deception technique to alter the information an enemy
may receive (Tyler, 1992)
.
If access is not denied to our adversaries during crisis
and maybe even during peacetime, and the resolution and
timeliness improve, one respondent felt that significant
intelligence against the U. S. may be gained by an adversary
(Talipsky) . Such information might introduce new
vulnerabilities to our surface combatants and non-combatants
(Brunner, 1992). Another felt that because of this access,
the U. S. may be more prone to terrorist attacks (Ogle, 1992)
.
If a country has enough money available to gain access to the
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MSI information and can pay to have trained personnel exploit
it, then the MSI information could more easily be used against
us .
One respondent felt that only sophisticated countries or
threats would use this type of information against the U. S.,
since much of the information that can be gained about the
U. S. is already available from other less expensive, open
sources (Tandy, 1992) . This may not be true, however, of
other countries. Some of the countries we may be supporting
or fighting against in future operations may not have maps or
charts of particular areas available.
E. OPTIMUM TIMELINESS
Timeliness, as with all intelligence information, is
extremely important where imagery is concerned. Depending on
the situation some respondents had more than one requirement
for MSI timeliness. One respondent summed up what others
touched on and that is that optimum timeliness depends on:
... the threat posture of the targeted location. As
inevitable strike dates grow closer, the system must be
able to keep up with the demand. (Kinnane, 1992)
Of the respondents, 43 percent felt that daily updates
were necessary for planning. This would only be useful if
Landsat and Spot information were available on a more timely
basis
.
Requirements for contingency driven updates were also
high, with 38 percent of respondents requiring this
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timeliness. If a crisis or contingency does take place, then
immediate, 24-hour or less, updates would be required.
Monthly updates were recommended for long term strike
planning (Brunner, Dodsworth, Farrell, Parmenter, Thompson,
1992) . This is probably the most feasible current use of MSI
data considering the timeliness, or lack thereof, of current
Landsat and Spot products. While these updates could be used
for long term planning, one respondent would like to see MSI
being used for historical studies as well (Tyler, 1992).
F. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS /RECOMMENDATIONS
As with all information intended for direct support of the
Fleet, the question always arises as to distribution of
information to the user. Fleet Imagery Support Terminal
(FIST) transmissions were suggested as a means of transmitting
MSI to the Fleet (Talipsky, 1992) . Additionally, some type of
commercial video image transmission system was suggested
(Talipsky, 1992). Transmission of MSI to the Fleet will
require a great deal of research since transmission of MSI
data will probably take a lot longer than what is transmitted
on the current military systems today.
One respondent recommended that Landsat and Spot products
be available without DoD users having to go through the DMA to
purchase MSI products (Dodsworth, 1992). Another respondent
recommended that personnel be trained to exploit and
understand MSI and the products that can be used from these
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systems. She also suggested that a deployable pool of trained
photographic interpreters be available to the Fleet for the
near term (Tyler, 1992) . These ideas will both be discussed
further in chapter VI
.
37
V. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY
A survey was conducted of the Naval Intelligence Training
Council (NITC) Conference on 13 May 1992 to ascertain what
requirements the Intelligence Community has for MSI
information and products. Results of the 18 surveys were as
varied as the commands that were represented, including:
COMTHIRDFLT, COMNAVSURFPAC , COMNAVSURFLANT, COMNAVAIRPAC
,
COMNAVAIRLANT, COMCARGRU ONE, JICPAC, CENPROGFAC , DIA-DET-2
FITCPAC, VT-10. Many respondents answered questions with more
than one answer. So, while it may appear that there are many
more answers than participants, the answers are not mutually
exclusive of each other. The survey was identical to the one
given to the CNO Tactical Development and Evaluation
Conference and was conducted to determine: 1) If the
respondent was previously aware of MSI capabilities and
implications; 2) In what areas of planning the respondent
would like to see a more extensive use of MSI; what the
respondent would like MSI to do for them; 3) What the
respondent views as the most desirable distribution of MSI
products and information; 4) What the respondent views as
operational security concerns, if a potential enemy can access
and exploit information from the commercially available MSI
products; 5) What the respondent considers to be the optimum
timeliness in receiving MSI products; monthly updates; daily
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updates; contingency-driven updates; 6) Additional
Comment s/Recommendat ions . The responses are discussed in this
chapter
.
A. AWARENESS OF MULTI SPECTRAL IMAGERY
Of the 18 respondents, 17 percent did not know anything
about MSI and its implications. While 83 percent knew
something about MSI, some only knew a limited scope of MSI
capabilities and implications.
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR MSI IN PLANNING
We need to understand exactly what MSI can do for us. Any
warfare area that can be supported is a target for
support. Smart folks need to study this sensor and sell
it applicably. (Costarino, 1992)
The majority of respondents were interested in MSI for
intelligence support to amphibious operations (Kessler,
McKeldin, Olsen, Thomas, Sullivan, 1992). One respondent
believed that MSI has its greatest potential in amphibious
planning and beach studies (McKeldin, 1992) . He also
accurately states that these studies were of great value to U.
S. Marines during Desert Shield/Storm contingency planning
(McKeldin, 1992). Several respondents mentioned that MSI
would be extremely useful in supporting contingency operations
(Kelly, Nicholson, Sullivan, 1992), and that if it were more
available and timely, it could more successfully support short
notice contingencies for amphibious assaults (Sullivan, 1992)
.
Support with MSI information and products to the CJTF and
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component commands would be beneficial during contingencies
(Kelly, 1992) .
Use of MSI for targeting and strike warfare is a
requirement by some respondents (Hayes, Kelly, Nicholson,
Nikola, Stefansky, 1992). One respondent mentioned that
although he did not know much about the potential use of MSI
in targeting, it seemed to him that it could be very useful if
the timeliness of the products could be improved. He
suggested the use of non-commercial satellites for MSI
collection (Nicholson, 1992). Another respondent felt that,
while MSI could be used for targeting, its area coverage is so
broad that it would have limited application for targeting
(Kelly, 1992) . This is currently true about Landsat and Spot
systems. 1
'
1 Another respondent felt that targeting
intelligence for ATTG ' s , developed by the Joint Intelligence
Centers, would benefit from the use of MSI (Nikola, 1992) .
One respondent mentioned that MSI products were widely used
during Desert Shield/Storm for strike route planning and that
this imagery provides strike mission planners with "important
topographical information currently lacking in Defense Mapping
Agency products." (Stefansky, 1992) Mobile targeting is
another area where more extensive use of MSI was suggested
(Olivier, 1992)
.
19 See Chapter II for Landsat resolution characteristics, and
Chapter VII for Spot resolution characteristics.
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Mine detection and the use of MSI for the placement of
mines was also suggested (Caldwell, 1992) . One respondent
mentioned that the VP community should be aware of the
capabilities for mine-laying missions of Maritime Patrol
Aircraft (MPA) (Jacobson, 1992) .
Detection of maritime pollution was suggested as a future
requirement of MSI (Marshall, 1992). This may be required
more and more, since we may be drawn into defeating
environmental terrorism in future operations, as we did with
Iraq and the oil-well fires and oil spill during Desert
Shield/Storm.
The use of MSI for counter narcotic operations is a
requirement (Marshall, Nicholson, 1992), and MSI is probably
already being used for specific crop detection (Nicholson,
1992) .
MSI for Indications and Warnings (I & W) would be
beneficial according two respondents (Kelly, Kessler, 1992).
This would be particularly true if MSI information and
products were more timely (Kessler, 1992). Perhaps expert
daily analysis of MSI would benefit pre-exercise and pre-
operational planning (Kessler, 1992).
Terrain analysis for Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield (IPB) was a requirement by one respondent (Kelly,
1992), as was construction analysis of buildings and bunkers,
especially from a targeteer's point of view (Olivier, 1992).
Coinciding with construction analysis, is the requirement for
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land remote sensing systems to detect camouflage and deception
of potential adversaries (Caldwell, Nikola, 1992) . One
respondent would like to see an extensive use of MSI against
camouflage and deception which has been used to counter aerial
photographic reconnaissance (Nikola, 1992).
Detection of oceanic fronts and patterns was expressed as
a requirement for MSI (Marshall, 1992) .
Current MSI sensors are ideal for broad area coverage,
which continues to be a requirement for MSI products (Hayes,
Kelly, Stefansky, 1992) . These land remote sensors can be
used to image broad areas not covered by other imagery
sources, and this respondent felt that we need to develop MSI
interpretation expertise in the fleet to interpret those broad
areas (Stefansky, 1992) . The broad area coverage capability
could be used in "one-to-one integration with optical
imagery." (Hayes, 1992) MSI should be used in conjunction
with and to augment existing sensor systems to aid imagery
analysts in building target folders (Koualerzle, 1992)
.
C. DISTRIBUTION OF MSI TO THE FLEET
Fifty-six percent of the respondents felt distribution of
MSI products and information should be to the lowest level
possible, such as to ship, squadron, and Marine Expeditionary
Unit (MEU) intelligence officers and planners. The majority
of these respondents felt that this information would be most
valuable to the user aboard ship, particularly aboard aircraft
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carriers (Caldwell, Hayes, Kessler, Olivier, 1992) . One
respondent felt that if intelligence officers and specialists
could read and interpret the product that this would "greatly
enhance [the effectiveness of] pre/post brief intelligence to
aviators." (Kessler, 1992) Another respondent, who required
distribution of MSI to the "furthest most regions," would like
to see more development of MSI "to CD-ROM's for individual
ships and commands for strike warfare" use (Nikola, 1992)
.
One other respondent stated that MSI makes "pretty pictures
for ships, squadrons, etc. but they don't need them unless
it's missiles on the target time." (Nicholson, 1992) While
this may be true, some pre-planning must be done with MSI data
if it is to be incorporated into any mission planning.
Individual ships such as LHD's, LHA's, LPH's and flag-
equipped LPD's should receive MSI material according to one
respondent (McKeldin, 1992) . Some respondents recommended
that MSI products be disseminated to MEU's and tactical
amphibious squadrons (McKeldin, Sullivan, 1992).
Several respondents felt that distribution of MSI to the
carrier air wing would be best (Nicholson, Olivier, and
Stefansky, 1992) . One of these respondents suggested that MSI
information could best be used at the carrier air wing level
for "briefing, I&W, or targeting, as appropriate." (Nicholson,
1992) Another respondent felt that distribution of MSI to the
air wing level was important because CAG is the Strike Warfare
Commander and the "in-depth end game strike planning takes
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place at this level." (Stefansky, 1992) Additionally, carrier
air wing reorganization calls for "establishment of a
targeteer/BDA expertise on his staff." (Stefansky, 1992)
Forty-four percent of the respondents stated that MSI
should be disseminated to the carrier battle group staff. One
respondent felt that MSI information and products should be
disseminated to the Battle Group Staff, but in a limited
amount (Kelly, 1992), because carriers and ARG ' s should be the
main recipients. Meanwhile, others suggested that MSI be used
for strike planning (Jacobson, 1992) at the CVBG level or in
CONOPS support packages and SAO packages to augment other
information in those packages (Costarino, 1992).
Two of the respondents recommended that MSI be distributed
to ARG Staffs, especially for amphibious warfare planning
(Jacobson, Kelly, 1992). Others felt that PHIBGRU or PHIBRON
Staffs should be recipients of MSI data (Olsen, Sullivan,
1992) .
A limited amount of MSI information should be received at
Numbered Fleet or JTF Staffs (Caldwell, Jacobson, Kelly,
Olsen, 1992) . These staffs could use the information for
build-up to a crisis response and during the crisis or any
contingencies that may arise (Jacobson, 1992) .
Distribution of MSI should also include the Joint
Intelligence Centers, i.e. JICPAC, AIC (Jacobson, Koualerzle,
Marshall, 1992) . Hardcopy and softcopy products would both be
useful in augmenting existing sensor systems and aiding
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imagery analysts in all-source fusion analysis (Koualerzle,
1992) .
D. OPERATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
While operational security is paramount to national
security, there may be a problem with potential enemies
gaining access to information about our forces or country from
land remote sensing systems. One respondent suggested that the
element of surprise may be lost, if operational security is
not protected (Kessler, 1992) . A couple of respondents
mentioned that we cannot keep commercially available
information and products from our potential adversaries. We
must instead, be better and smarter at using MSI information
than our adversaries (Costarino, McKeldin, 1992) . We need to
concentrate our strengths in "processing, distributing, and
fusing information" to gain the lead in MSI exploitation over
our potential adversaries (Costarino, 1992) . We need to know
"our own vulnerability to this system and then how to correct
the problem." (Thomas, 1992)
One respondent mentioned that operational security is of
"no significance" on a daily basis as far as the fact that the
U. S. uses MSI, but it may become a concern if the potential
enemy determines how we intend to use it in a particular
operation (Caldwell, 1992). Another felt that the U. S. would
"want to keep a lid on" how we use MSI in future operations,
including strike warfare (Nikola, 1992).
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One area that may be a potential problem in using MSI, is
in counter-narcotic operations. Some respondents felt that
narcotics operations may be hampered if drug crop growers can
hide their crops in some way, thus countering these systems.
(Kelly, Kessler, 1992)
Another potential problem could arise for U. S. forces
deployed overseas where land remote sensing collection could
locate them in foreign ports or on foreign bases (Kelly,
1992) . One suggestion to counter imaging of bases in our own
country is to place restrictions, which must be enforced, on
imaging of areas near our military installations (Olivier,
1992) . With commercial satellite systems such as Spot and
Landsat it is virtually impossible to impose such
restrictions. If we can determine what our potential enemies
are looking at, that may help us determine their intentions,
and we may be able to counter them (Nicholson, 1992) . Several
respondents suggested ways to counter our potential
adversaries' ability to use MSI against us. We must become
experts in MSI capabilities and implications before we can
counter with camouflage, deception and misinformation
(Stefansky, 1992) . Once we understand MSI capabilities we
must consider developing a policy of cover and deception
(Hayes, 1992) . Measures to alter MSI signatures were also
suggested as a means for giving the potential enemy
misinformation (Marshall, 1992).
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Finally, one respondent felt that commercially available
MSI products should be made illegal (Sullivan, 1992), probably
because of many of the above cited reasons.
Proliferation of land remote sensing systems from other
countries was also of concern to OPSEC (Elder, 1992) . Some
countries, such as the Former Soviet Union (FSU) , have a
proliferation of these systems and we should be concerned with
to whom these systems are being sold to obtain hard currency
to resolve their severe economic crisis (Elder, 1992) .
E. TIMELINESS OF MSI DISTRIBUTION
Timeliness of MSI products and information is crucial if
it is to be used as an intelligence tool. This is supported
by the fifty-six percent of the respondents who agreed that
optimum timeliness for receipt of MSI products will be
contingency-driven. Some respondents recommended that MSI be
a part of the original targeting package given to deploying
ships and that these packages be augmented with MSI as
contingencies or crises arise (Costarino, Olivier, 1992).
While MSI information and products should be driven by the
contingency, JIC's, AIC and Naval Strike Warfare Center (NSWC)
"should know CONOPS requirements and thus can provide guidance
and subsequent distribution to the fleet." (Nicholson, 1992)
A couple of respondents suggested that a monthly updated
baseline of data for "areas where significant changes occur
regularly" (Hayes, 1992) or for "routine, mundane targets and
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geographic areas" (McKeldin, 1992) would be acceptable as long
as the system can "flex to increased requirements to support
a contingency operation." (Hayes, 1992) Contingency-driven
updates would be appropriate to "determine changes between
imagery" (Marshall, 1992) such as for "new construction and in
response to specific tasking" (Caldwell, 1992) and in support
of such operations as "Sharp Edge, Eastern Exit and Desert
Shield/Storm." (McKeldin, 1992) One respondent suggested that
recurrence of imaging be conducted monthly for drug crops and
every six months to a year for urban areas, depending on
construction and other activity (Elder, 1992). Another
suggested that updates for exercises be every 30 days, but
within 48 hours for contingencies (Sullivan, 1992)
.
Some respondents felt that daily updates, depending on
what part of the world we are concerned with, would be most
appropriate. One respondent mentioned that "during crises,
daily updates would be ideal," and that "MSI should be
digitized for dissemination." (Stefansky, 1992) As was
suggested by one respondent, these daily updates, particularly
during a contingency, should be disseminated to the CJTF and
ashore intelligence centers (Jacobson, 1992).
As previously suggested, the more routine targets should
be updated monthly by MSI products. Additionally, one
respondent suggested that initial distribution of MSI data
should take place prior to crisis planning, then that
information should be updated monthly (Kelly, 1992) . Another
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suggested that monthly updates should go to the JIC's and AIC
(Jacobson, 1992) .
One respondent recommended quarterly updates only if
"major upgrades or degradations" were apparent (Nikola, 1992) .
F. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS /RECOMMENDATIONS FROM RESPONDENTS
Future uses of MSI products was what interested most of
the respondents. One was interested in how MSI information
can be further utilized for strike planning (Nikola, 1992) .
Another suggested that specific examples of MSI products and
information should be provided to potential recipients, i.e.,
Fleet Commanders and aircraft carriers (Caldwell, 1992), while
another recommended that carriers and carrier air wings "must
be able to receive MSI [data] via new imagery support systems
in order to support CONOPS . " (Olivier, 1992) One respondent
pointed out that there are many professional intelligence
analysts who do not understand what MSI can do for them, and
he suggested that the "Science and Technology community needs
education" on MSI (Marshall, 1992), if we are to use it to its
fullest capabilities in the future.
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VI. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR MULTISPECTRAL IMAGERY?
For global research, environmental management, and
national security purposes , in part icular , continuation of
the Landsat program through the 1990 's will be mission
essential. (H. R. 3614, 1992)
For the past ten years numerous studies have been
conducted to determine what the requirements and applications
are for MSI in DOD, and in the naval service in particular.
Landsats-1 through -5 have supported many of the requirements
of the civil, commercial, and military sectors of our society.
The future of Landsat looks bright if DOD continues to pour
money into the capabilities of new systems.
A. LANDSAT 6
The launch of Landsat-6 in early 1993 will mark the
beginning of the new era in commercial remote sensing (EOSAT,
Landsat ' s Anniversary, 1992). Follow-on systems such as
Landsat-7, which will be jointly operated by DOD and NASA,
will continue to enhance U. S. remote sensing capabilities and
keep the U. S. in the fore-front in commercial land remote
sensing. Meanwhile, foreign land remote sensing systems will
continue to compete with Landsat for commercial sales and
possibly will affect our national security.
After an 18-month shutdown, due to funding uncertainty and
political reasons, EOSAT restarted its development work on
Landsat-6 in April 1988 (Radzanowski , 1991). Development of
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Landsat-6, under construction by General Electric Astro-Space,
is estimated by EOSAT to cost roughly $240 million
(Radzanowski, 1991) .
Landsat-6 will carry the Enhanced Thematic Mapper (ETM)
,
which is the next generation sensor with mult ispectral
capabilities identical to the Thematic Mapper (TM) onboard
Landsats-4 and -5 (EOSAT, Landsat ' s Anniversary, 1992). The
ETM will provide 30-meter ground resolution in seven spectral
bands with the addition of a panchromatic band J with 15-
meter spatial resolution (GE Astro Space) . Because Landsat-6
will have the same spectral capabilities as Landsats-4 and -5,
data continuity is assured (EOSAT, Landsat 's Anniversary,
1992) . EOSAT was also considering a Sea-Wide Field-of -View
Sensor (SEA-WIFS) to provide ocean color and temperature
information, but due to spacecraft cost considerations, the
instrument was not included on Landsat-6 (Radzanowski, 1991) .
Additionally, two tape recorders will store image data when
Landsat-6 is not within range of a ground station for later
transmission, when it is within range of a ground station (GE
Astro Space)
.
EOSAT will continue as the contractor to the Landsat-6
system and will cover the costs of operations and continued
marketing of unenhanced data (Radzanowski, 91) . Landsat-6
20This is a black and white image
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will be launched by a Titan II rocket and is expected to have
a five year design life (GE Astro Space)
.
The ground station in the U. S., which has just opened
this year near Norman, Oklahoma, was transferred from EOSAT
-
controlled, government -owned equipment to being completely
controlled by privately-owned equipment with EOSAT revenues.
All data acquisition, satellite control, and ground equipment
maintenance will be EOSAT' s responsibility and at EOSAT'
s
expense (EOSAT, Spring 1992) . Norman's mid-continent location
will provide real-time direct downlink capabilities for image
acquisitions over the entire continental U. S. The new
station will also receive international imagery data stored on
Landsat-6's on board recorders (Radzanowski , 1991).
B. LANDSAT-7
For more than a decade, Landsat has been surrounded by a
cloud of uncertainty that has harmed market growth and
stigmatized the program. - Representative Brown (Asker,
1991)
After twenty years of being shuffled from one government
agency to another and then to the private sector, the Landsat
program is being shuffled again, back to the government. In
February 1992, President Bush signed National Space Policy
Directive 5 (NSPD 5) defining the roles for NASA and DOD in
the future of the Landsat program. The Directive also
clarifies the roles of the Departments of Commerce, Energy,
and the Interior in connection with Landsat (Bush, 1992) . The
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Directive contains strategy and guidelines similar to two
bills that were to be proposed to Congress. The two bills,
H.R. 3614, National Landsat Policy Act of 1992 (Brown Bill),
and S. 2297, Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (Pressler
Bill), proposed sweeping reforms in the Landsat program
(Asker, July 13, 1992) .
1. National Landsat Policy Act of 1992 (Brown Bill)
Representative George Brown, Jr. (D-Calif ornia)
,
chairman of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee,
introduced legislation concerning Landsat in October 1991
(Asker, 1991) . The legislation, which was approved by the
Committee, repealed the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization
Act of 1984. It would also shift Landsat oversight from NOAA
to a Joint Program Office (JPO) , to be administered by NASA
and DOD (EOSAT, Winter 1991)
.
Historically, no federal agency has found the Landsat
program important enough to want to manage it or pay for it,
although many departments use it extensively (Asker, 1991).
DOD is the largest user of MSI, particularly following its
extensive use of Landsat imagery during Desert Shield/Storm.
The temptation now is for policy makers to make DOD pay for
Landsat, but some fear that may lead to restrictions on access
to remote sensing data (Asker, 1991). Additionally, if sole
control of the Landsat program is given to DOD, this would
greatly alert international perceptions of the program, which
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was specifically initiated as a demonstration of the U. S.'s
commitment to the peaceful use of space (Brown, 1992 )
.
Consolidating military and commercial requirements, funding,
and management responsibilities into a JPO would be the most
logical management of the Landsat program. Therefore, the
solution may be in Representative Brown's suggestion that the
JPO be comprised of DOD and NASA.
The National Space Council endorsed the concept of the
JPO and announced that the Administration would seek funds in
FY93 to build Landsat-7 (EOSAT, Winter 1991) . This joint
management would include acquisition and operation of a
Landsat-7 satellite "as quickly as practicable which is, at a
minimum, functionally equivalent to the Landsat-6 satellite"
(H. R. 3614, 1992) . The projected operating life of Landsat-6
requires that construction of Landsat-7, which has been
postponed several times by federal budget-makers, be
accelerated to avoid creating a gap in Landsat data coverage
(EOSAT, Winter 1991) .
The Brown Bill would also offer a two-tier pricing
system, one for commercial enterprises and another for
government, academics, and other domestic non-profit users
(Asker, 1991) . Non-profit users in the U. S. would pay only
the marginal costs of acquiring and distributing Landsat data,
while all other buyers would pay the full commercial price
(EOSAT, Winter 1991). In the recent past, use of Landsat
imagery by non-profit users has dropped dramatically because
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prices rose after Landsat was turned over to a private
contractor. Researchers are paying more, primarily because
government subsidies of their Landsat work, which were often
not readily apparent before commercialization, have
disappeared (Asker, July 13, 1992) In 1985, prior to the
EOSAT contract, NOAA charged $4,400 for a digital Thematic
Mapper data scene (Radzanowski , 1991) . Under EOSAT, the price
fell to $3,300 but has recently risen back to $4,400
(Radzanowski, 1991). EOSAT's president, Arturo Selvestrini,
maintains that the true costs of operating Landsat have come
down under private management . The real cost of Landsat
digital products is 21 percent lower in 1992 than in 1985
(Asker, July 13, 1992) . While this two-tier system may not be
a problem as long as the government is running the show, there
may be problems with this pricing scale if a private company
is contracted for Landsat operations and tries to make a
profit (EOSAT, Winter 1991). EOSAT company's then interim
president, Jay Buckley, said that the proposed legislation
provides a basis to negotiate a stable future for Landsat
(Asker, 1991) . There may also be a problem with policing who
is a non-profit agency and who is not.
2. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (Pressler Bill)
Senator Larry Pressler (R-South Dakota) , the ranking
Republican on the Senate Science, Technology, and Space
subcommittee, proposed legislation similar to Representative
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Brown's proposal, but with one major difference. Instead of
a two-tiered system, Pressler proposed that all Landsat
imagery be sold to anyone for the marginal cost of producing
the pictures (Asker, July 13, 1992) . This of course could
only happen if the government runs the show and does not plan
to make any profit. This would drastically reduce the price
of a single Landsat scene from as much as $4,400 to about $500
(Asker, May 11, 1992) . Officials of NASA and the Departments
of Defense, Commerce and the Interior maintain that Pressler's
proposal would be too rigid, needlessly tying the hands of
future policy-makers trying to promote easy access to remote
sensing data (Asker, May 11, 1992)
.
Bush Administration officials maintain that they can
accomplish similar goals with NSPD 5.
3. National Space Policy Directive 5 (NSPD5) ( Land Remote
Sensing Strategy )
In its realignment of the future for the Landsat
program, NSPD 5, which was signed by President Bush 5 February
1992, identifies three major goals for the U. S. government:
• Provide Landsat data which is consistent with previous
Landsat data (Landsats-1 through -5)
;
• Availability of Landsat data to national security, global
change research and other federal users;
• Promote private sector commercial opportunities for
Landsat-type remote sensing (Bush, 1992).
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NSPD 5 also lays out a Landsat strategy for the U. S.,
including
:
Continuity of Landsat ' s -4 and -5, until Landsat-6 becomes
operational
;
Acquire Landsat-7 to maintain continuity of Landsat-type
data beyond the projected Landsat-6 end-of-life;
Development of advanced remote sensing technologies
reducing cost, while increasing performance;
Minimize cost of Landsat-type data for U. S. government
agencies
;
Limit U. S. government regulations affecting private
sector remote sensing activities;
Maintain an archive of Landsat images;
Consider alternatives for maintaining continuity of data
beyond Landsat-7 (Bush, 1992).
Implementing guidelines for NASA and the Departments
of Commerce, Defense and Interior include the following:
• DOC - complete and launch Landsat-6; continued operations
of Landsat 's -4 and -5;
• DOD and NASA - develop and launch Landsat-7 satellite;
with Department of Energy (DOE) and other appropriate
agencies, prepare a coordinated technology plan for
improving performance and reducing cost of future Landsat-
type remote sensing systems;
• DOI - continue to maintain national archives (Bush, 1992) .
The DOD and NASA Management Plan for the Landsat
Program responded to NSPD 5. The Plan is a cooperation in the
continuation of the Landsat program, including the development
and operations of a Landsat follow-on (Landsat-7) satellite,
as well as in planning for future operations and advanced
57
technology development with other appropriate agencies (Atwood
and Truly, 1992) .
DOD will have the lead responsibility for the
acquisition and launch of the Landsat-7 satellite. NASA will
have the lead responsibility for the development and operation
of the Landsat ground system, including data processing,
archiving, distribution, user support and mission operations
management. Representatives from DOD and NASA will jointly
chair the Landsat Coordinating Group (LCG) , which will be
responsible for top level policy and budget making decisions.
NASA and DOD will each fund the portion of the program for
which they are responsible. (Atwood and Truly, 1992)
Evaluating opportunities for international cooperation
and utilization of Landsat will be the responsibility of NASA,
with DOD support. NASA will have the lead responsibility for
promoting and periodically assessing U. S. commercial
opportunities. Additionally, NASA, DOD, and other U. S.
government agencies are pursuing advanced technologies for
future land remote sensing systems. (Atwood and Truly, 1992)
The National Space Council -member agencies reviewed
the DOD/NASA Management Plan for Landsat Program and are
supportive of the "streamlined management approach and
assignment of responsibilities outlined in the Plan."
(Albrecht, 1992)
While government control of future Landsat systems
will affect EOSAT's future in remote sensing, the company said
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it was pleased with the NSPD 5 directive because it "renews
the federal commitment to assure data continuity and
availability after Landsat-5 . . . " (EOSAT, Spring 1992).
The Eush Administration directive specifically
addresses Landsat-7, which has not yet been designed. EOSAT
and others are concerned that the plans for that satellite
must be drawn now to avoid a data gap. (EOSAT, Spring 1992)
EOSAT said the directive will "inspire customer
confidence in the long-term availability of EOSAT' s products,
and thus improve the competitive stance of the U. S. land
remote sensing industry" . EOSAT also mentioned that the
policy directive will keep the U. S. as a leader in commercial
land remote sensing. EOSAT anticipates that they will have
a good working relationship with DOD and NASA, and "will
contribute to this policy directive...". (EOSAT, Spring 1992)
C. THE CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE (CIO)
The need for the new CIO being established by the Pentagon
was approved by the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Robert Gates and Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman General Colin Powell. The CIO
will coordinate production and distribution of strategic and
tactical imagery, thus facilitating the sharing of information
during operations. According to Vice Admiral McConnell,
Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) , the CIO should
serve as a combat support agency to collect and distribute
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photographs in much the same way that the NSA manages signals
intelligence (SIGINT) (" Imagery Of f ice Centralizes ..." , 1992;
"Pentagon Plans...", 1992). While the Defense Mapping Agency
(DMA) currently is chartered by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
(ASD/C3I) as the MSI broker for DOD (Lesher, 1992), the CIO
should take over these responsibilities. MSI responsibilities
were forced upon DMA, who was never very enthusiastic about
being the MSI broker for DOD (Lesher, 1992). While DMA does
use MSI extensively for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G)
,
its support to DOD has not been exceptional.
If DOD MSI acquisition were placed under the CIO, there
would probably be more effort made to run a more efficient and
timely program.
D. CURRENT NAVAL USERS OF MULTI SPECTRAL IMAGERY
The Naval Space Command Detachment (NAVSPACECOM DET) in
Colorado Springs, Colorado is the primary command for MSI in
the Navy. To correct deficiencies that existed in providing
MSI support to tactical forces during the Gulf War,
NAVSPACECOM DET is organizing, staffing, and training an MSI
implementation team. The primary focus of the team will be to
work closely with Fleet units in identifying Fleet
requirements for MSI support ("MSI Workstation...", 1992).
NAVSPACECOM DET will provide support for fleet exercises,
provide technical support to naval units, develop and
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implement training packages in support of the formal schools
systems, conduct on-site training, and support specialized
pre-deployment training needs of the Fleet and Fleet Marine
Forces (FMF) . NAVSPACECOM DET is funded by OP-943 for this
program. Eventually, NAVSPACECOM DET will provide a one-stop
shop for MSI technical issues within the Navy and Marine Corps
("MSI Workstation...", 1992).
NAVSPACECOM DET is currently supporting Naval Strike
Warfare Center (NSWC) and the Navy and Marine Corps
Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) ("MSI Workstation...",
1992) .
Several naval intelligence centers are using MSI to
support intelligence requirements. Fleet Intelligence Center
Pacific (FICPAC) , now JICPAC, was probably the most successful
naval user of MSI during Desert Storm, and JICPAC continues
its use of MSI data. Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) uses
MSI mainly for terrain analysis (Capps, 1992) . Interestingly,
at both these commands, the Marines are the most avid users of
MSI systems and products. At the Marine Corps Intelligence
Center, (MCIC) in Quantico a handbook has been produced for
Marine Corps MSI users. MCIC will be supporting Marine units
with MSI (Rowan, 1992) . The study conducted by the MCIC found
that lack of knowledgeable consumers was the biggest problem
it encountered in use of MSI (Rowan, 1992) .
Lack of knowledge about MSI products and information,
coupled with a lack of trained personnel to analyze the
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imagery, have been the two most critical elements in
increasing the use of MSI as a valuable intelligence tool.
Currently, the only formal, in-depth training available is a
two week class at the Defense Mapping School (DMS)
(Geodynamics, 1990) .
Unfortunately, in many instances Fleet or FMF consumers
are unaware of MSI data, products, and capabilities available
to support operations. Operators need to be made to
appreciate how MSI can support their operations. Without
support and use from the Fleet, valuable MSI capabilities
could go away and the Landsat program would lose its biggest
user
.
E. COMMERCIAL VIABILITY OF LANDSAT
Studies released in 1988 concluded that a fully commercial
remote sensing system will probably not be commercially viable
and competitive until early in the next century without a
significant amount of government support (Radzanowski , 1991).
Major reasons for this are:
• Limited market for data;
• High costs involved in improving technology;
• Lack of training and consumer awareness;
• Foreign competition which may have lowered the demand for
Landsat data, but which could stimulate competition
(Radzanowski, 1991) .
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In the 1984 Remote Sensing Act, complete commercialization
as originally envisaged is not possible, at least not in the
short-term, but possibly over a decade or two (Radzanowski
,
1991) . With continued government support full
commercialization may be realized (Radzanowski, 1991, 1991) .
Officials at EOSAT argue that commercialization is "on the
verge of succeeding." (Asker, May 11, 1992) The federal
subsidy to EOSAT to operate Landsats-4 and -5 ends in
September of this year. If the U. S. government actually ends
its support to the Landsat program then, and does not
subsidize follow-on Landsats as agreed to in the 1984 Act, it
could cost taxpayers millions of dollars, according to EOSAT
(Asker, May 11, 1992). This is probably because the U. S.
government had agreed to support the Landsat program through
Landsat-7. Supporters of commercialization believe that
Landsat 's commercial viability cannot be judged until the
government supports construction and launch of a Landsat-7
system, as originally planned (Radzanowski, 1991). All of
EOSAT' s foreign competitors are subsidized by their respective
governments, including the French Spot Image, which does not
expect to become fully commercialized until at least 1998
(Radzanowski, 1991). Others have suggested that the
commercialization of Landsat was premature, and that until
there is further development in commercial markets, ownership
and operation of the Landsat program should be returned to the
U. S. government (Radzanowski, 1991). Additionally, if the
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U. S. government does not respond to the needs of the
commercial market, foreign government subsidized systems may
meet the needs and a resulting reliance on foreign systems may
occur (Radzanowski , 1991).
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VII. FOREIGN COMPETITION
U. S. forces will one day be vulnerable to modern
satellite technologies that could jeopardize their
security due to the increasing availability of imaging
capabilities on the world market. - Vice Admiral Studeman
("Satellite Recce...", 1992)
As suggested in some of the responses to the surveys in
Chapters IV and V, our armed forces, bases and ports are
vulnerable to reconnaissance by foreign satellites whose
information may get into the hands of terrorists or Third
World countries. As the number and sophistication of foreign
land remote sensing satellites increase, these adversaries
could more easily obtain MSI data that could be used in
planning operations against the U. S. or its allies.
Testimony before the House Intelligence and House Science,
Space and Technology Committees about the Landsat program
provided details about the role of commercial imagery in
Desert Shield/Storm. The session stressed concerns about
Landsat data continuity and the dependence on foreign
satellite systems (Gilmartin, 1991) . A warning that foreign
remote sensing capabilities may be limited in the next
conflict or that the capability may not be there at all, was
given by Major General William James, Director of the Defense
Mapping Agency (DMA) (Gilmartin, 1991) .
Uncertainty of access to foreign MSI during a conflict was
exemplified by Spot Image during the Persian Gulf War. Spot
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Image rescinded its access rules of providing data to anyone
on a nondiscriminatory basis, and restricted access of imagery
of the Persian Gulf region to the U. S. and French
governments. Spot Image reinstated its open skies policy for
the Persian Gulf region on 22 March 1991. (Radzanowski , 1991)
In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, VADM Studeman said,
Modern technology, particularly in the area of imaging,
affords now a wide-range of other countries, including
people who are not friends of ours, to have access to the
technical means to conduct reconnaissance in the imaging
area and maybe even in some other technical areas.
("Satellite Recc...", 1992)
Two examples have been cited of how other countries are
attempting to get access to satellite imaging technology. One
is through foreign sales of imagery to Third World Countries
.
The second is that applications for licenses for the export of
U. S. technology to Third World countries for related
technology are continually being submitted. ("Satellite
Recce. . . " , 1992)
While some who work with remote sensing data, particularly
in DOD, would prefer to see limited sales of this data and its
technology to foreign countries, others would like to see more
cooperation between countries. One suggestion for more
cooperation is the creation of an international cooperative
venture for "the developing, financing, managing, and
operating [of] a commercial remote sensing satellite system."
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(Radzanowski, 1991) Cooperation between two or more countries
could:
• Eliminate competition for a limited market;
• Reduce development costs for new technologies;
• Eliminate the redundancy of systems worldwide;
• Significantly reduce the amount of government subsidies
needed to operate such a system (Radzanowski, 1991).
Of course this type of cooperation would require
international agreements on many different aspects of the
system, including the negotiations on the operational
framework for the system and implementation of day-to-day
management processes and procedures (Radzanowski, 1991).
Other agreements would have to be worked out, including:
• Distribution of high resolution data. Guidelines adopted
by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, in 1986,
promote international cooperation and access to data on a
nondiscriminatory basis. There is no requirement that
prior consent be obtained before one country can survey
another's resources. The U. S. may not want to distribute
high resolution data of its own country.
• Individual countries, like the U. S., could potentially
lose some degree of political and technical control over
the system. This could compromise domestic services
rendered to users of their particular country, if
satellites have to be shared.
• Risk of potential for politicization, where one group of
nations may seek to bar another nation from participating
in the benefits of an international system for purely
political reasons. (Radzanowski, 1991)
If the U. S. is considering international cooperation for
land remote sensing, then those making decisions should be
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aware that :
...it is the consensus of the U. S. government and
industry that this option be employed only after the U. S.
has developed a stable and long-term program in order to
negotiate from a position of strength. If it does not,
there is the potential that the U. S. will become the
weaker partner with lesser participation in the venture.
(Radzanowski, 1991)
Currently EOSAT and its French counterpart, Spot Image, do
cooperate with each other to a certain extent. They each look
at their counterpart as fellow developers of a rapidly growing
market, and they are both aware of the complementary nature of
their data (Asker, 13 July, 1992) . Landsat sensors include
broader spectral bands, which are advantageous for vegetation
and bathymetric studies. Landsat also has a wider swath width
than Spot, so broad area coverage is greater with Landsat.
Spot data offers a finer spatial resolution, to 10-meters with
its panchromatic sensors, while Landsat Thematic Mapper (TM)
offers a 30-meter resolution (Asker, 13 July, 1992). Various
government agencies have used Spot 10-meter resolution imagery
merged with Landsat 's 30-meter TM to enhance a Landsat image
(Wilcox, 1992) . This is beneficial because it merges
information from various spectral bands of the Landsat data
with the high resolution of Spot data.
Another indication of market potential for remote sensing
data is seen in agreements between private companies. In
early July 1992, International Business Machines (IBM) Corp.
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and Spot Image Corp."' 1 signed an agreement for IBM to market
Spot satellite imagery (Asker, 13 July, 1992). Additionally,
IBM is expected to enter the software market for geographic
information systems (GIS) 22 The use of GIS or similar
programs is a stronger growth area for MSI data than just
selling pictures from satellites, according to Theodore Nanz,
Spot Image Corp.'s president (Asker, 13 July, 1992).
Nanz has been working to "organize the remote sensing
industry to make clear to researchers the capabilities that
Spot and Landsat offer." (Asker, 13 July, 1992) Neither Nanz
nor EOSAT's president, Arturo Silvestrini foresee strong
newcomers to remote sensing in the next few years (Asker, 13
July, 1992) . Silvestrini is however, concerned about India,
who may be the basis of "potent commercial competition, " but
whose satellites do not come close to the technological state
21 Spot Image Corporation was established to market the French
Spot Image data exclusively in the U. S. and is based in Reston,
VA.
""GIS is a broad term covering systems that use software and
hardware to manipulate and analyze a wide variety of data organized
geographically. All sorts of information are combined with maps
and other spatial data and accessed on work stations, or even on
personal computers, to solve complex management and planning
problems (Asker, 13 July, 1992) . The idea of using remote sensing
data, or MSI, to enhance outdated maps was used by DOD
organizations during Desert Shield/Storm (Wilcox, 1992), and this
application continues to be used today (Capps, 1992) . Erdas Inc.,
of Atlanta, which was spun off by NASA and the state of Georgia,
pioneered GIS, combining prototype GIS concepts developed at
Harvard University to create a Landsat/GIS processing system on a
micro-computer in 1978 (Asker, 13 July, 1992). Today, Erdas has
sold in-house developed systems for processing remote sensing data
in more than 70 countries (Asker, 13 July, 1992).
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of the art systems available (Asker, 13 July, 1992) . There is
however, competition from foreign nations which have developed
their own remote sensing capabilities and are marketing the
data (Radzanowski , 1991) . The following gives a brief
overview of what foreign countries, or groups of countries,
are doing regarding remote sensing.
A. FRANCE - SPOT IMAGE
The French launched their first commercial remote sensing
satellite, Systeme Probatoire d' Observation de la Terre (SPOT-
1), in February 1986 (Radzanowski, 1991). The Spot program
was developed under the leadership of the French Space agency,
CNES, in 1981 (Radzanowski, 1991) . Major investors in the
system included France, Belgium and Sweden.
Spot, like Landsat, has failed to live up to its ambitious
commercial promise. The first Spot satellite was supposed to
generate revenue to pay for the next satellite. So far though
CNES, not Spot Image, has funded four satellites. Spot Image
authorities have said that their company covers the costs of
running Spot-1 and -2. (Asker, 13 July, 1992)
Spot-2 was successfully launched in January, 1990
(Radzanowski, 1991) . Spot-1 was put in a hibernation mode in
January 1991, but was reactivated in March of that year to
meet customer needs (Lenorovitz, 1992) . It will probably be
placed back in hibernation in late 1992 (Lenorovitz, 1992).
In 1987, the French government approved procurement of Spot-3
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through public funds, but financing for Spot-4 was partially
tied to the participation of the European Community (EC)
(Radzanowski , 1991) . Without EC participation, the approval
of Spot-4 was decided by French Prime Minister Michel Rocard
in July 1989. While he approved Spot-4, Rocard said that it
would be the last Spot procurement on the public budget
(Radzanowski, 1991) . In addition to the satellites, CNES now
pays more than half of Spot Image's operating costs
(Radzanowski, 1991) .
Spot-3 is completed and is in storage. Its launch will be
determined by the operating condition of Spot-2, which is
"aging normally in orbit" according to Gerard Brachet, Spot
Image's chairman (Lenorovitz, 1992).
Spot-4 will probably not be launched until 1996 or 1997
depending on how Spot-3 functions. Spot-5, which is
envisioned for launch in 1999 or later is planned for a 5-
meter spatial resolution, and stereo imaging capability along
the satellite's flight path. Spot Image is hoping that France
will allocate funding in 1993 which would allow definition
work for Spot-5 to start next year. Another goal for Spot-5
is to retain a fairly wide field of view for the imagery.
Additionally, Spot Image wants to have Spot-5 carry one of the
high-resolution visible (HRV) instruments used on the first
generation satellites. This will provide data continuity for
those who use this data. Obviously, France is concerned about
improving its payload for Spot-5. (Lenorovitz, 1992)
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As a result of lessons learned from Desert Storm, the
U. S. Air Force is recommending that imagery from Spot be an
integral part of reconnaissance capabilities. Spot imagery
was used widely as a part of the allied air campaign against
Iraq. DMA data combined with Spot imagery enabled
geoposit ioning accuracy of less than 200 feet. According to
the Spot final report from Desert Storm, "All aircrews
interviewed considered coordinates and elevations derived from
DMA-aligned Spot imagery to be extremely accurate and an
indispensable aid for navigation and weapons delivery."
(Covault, 1992) The Air Force considers procurement of
additional Spot data a "fundamental element of a new
operational reconnaissance imaging architecture being formed
by DOD and the CIA." 2 - (Covault, 1992) Additionally, the Air
Force is seeking permission for "Eagle Vision"-'1 which could
be underway as early as 1992 (Covault, 1992) . While the U. S.
used Spot data extensively in support of operations during
Desert Storm, the U. S. government needs to consider all
aspects of dependency on foreign MSI data when contracting
with another country.
Spot Image has mentioned to U. S. officials that it is
"ready and willing" to take over data distribution for the
23This is probably in reference to the CIO.
^"Eagle Vision" would be another test of Spot capabilities
using a small mobile ground station to receive images in the field
directly from the French satellite (Covault, 1992).
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Landsat satellite, according to Brachet . Several years ago
France initiated discussions with the U. S. Commerce
Department on the possibility of bringing together the Spot
and Landsat programs. The conversations ended and were never
reinitiated. (Lenorovitz, 1992)
U. S. reliance on foreign MSI satellites and data deserves
careful consideration. In the past some of our allies have
not cooperated with us in granting our armed forces basing
privileges or overflight permission. For example, in 1986
France refused to allow FB-lll's, launching from bases in
England, overflight permission to participate in the Libyan
raids. In March 1987 only Portugal would allow U. S. Air
Force aircraft to land and refuel enroute to Saudi Arabia; no
other NATO ally would grant such permission. In this instance
the Air Force F-15's and their support aircraft had to fly
from the Azores non-stop to Riyahd. These are examples of the
risk of reliance that U. S. government agencies must remember
when considering cooperation and contracts with foreign
countries .
B. THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU)
The FSU has two types of land remote sensing programs.
The Soyuzkarta, which is usually launched as a dedicated
satellite to obtain data after the order is placed, has a
spatial resolution of 5-meters (Radzanowski , 1991). The
satellites can stay in orbit up to four weeks and use actual
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photographic film that is exposed in orbit and ejected in a
capsule that is recovered on earth (Radzanowski , 1991) . On 6
May 1992, Spot Image Corp., in the U. S., signed an agreement
with Central Trading Systems to share commercial distribution
of Soyuzkarta images (Spotlight, 1992) . These images are wide
area coverage with a wide swath of 120 km (Spotlight, 1992)
.
The second system, the Almaz-1, launched 31 March 1991,
was the first commercial radar satellite launched
(Radzanowski, 1991). Originally developed for military
reconnaissance, the satellite has a synthetic aperture radar
(SAR) which is capable of imaging at night, through clouds and
even into the water and sand to a limited degree (Radzanowski,
1991, and Asker, 13 July, 1992) . Almaz images have a
resolution of 15-30 meters, and the radar has a strong
response from metallic objects and is sensitive to changes in
soil moisture (Spotlight, 1992) . Spot Image Corp. also
distributes this imagery (Spotlight, 1992).
C . JAPAN
Japan has developed two remote sensing satellites since
the mid-1980 's when the Space Activities Commission (SAC) of
Japan recommended that a series of marine and land observation
satellites be developed. This recommendation resulted in the
development of the Marine Observation Satellite (MOS, or MOMO)
and the Japanese Earth Resources Satellite (JERS-1).
(Radzanowski, 1991)
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The M0S-1A satellite, launched in early 1987, is equipped
with a mult ispectral electronic self -scanning radiometer
(MESSR) , a visible and thermal infrared radiometer (VTIR) , and
a microwave scanning radiometer (MSR) (Radzanowski , 1991, and
Hatoyama-Machi, 1990). By August 1990, MOS-1A had exceeded
its design life, while MOS-1B was launched earlier that year
(Hatoyama-Machi, 1990) . MOS-1B is expected to function until
1993 or 1994. Both these satellites are providing the
Japanese with high quality MSI data (Hatoyama-Machi, 1990) .
Agencies and countries other then Japan receiving MOS data at
their own ground stations include, ESA, Canada, France,
Thailand, Australia, and the U. S. (Radzanowski, 1991).
JERS-1, launched in February 1992, is designed to carry a
SAR and a visible and near infrared radiometer (VNIR) capable
of stereoscopic imaging (Radzanowski, 1991) . Its SAR produces
high contrast and accurate determinations of topographical
features in day or night, independent of vegetation cover or
weather (Proctor, 1992). JERS-1 is co-sponsored by Japan's
National Space Development Agency (NASDA) , and the Ministry of
Trade and Industry (MITI) (Hatoyama-Machi, 1990) . About 300
researchers worldwide have been approved for distribution from
the JERS-1 satellite (Proctor, 1992) . JERS-1 data will also
be exchanged with other national space agencies, including
NASA (Proctor, 1992) .
Japan's Advanced Earth Observing Satellite (ADEOS)
,
originally scheduled for launch in 1995, will not be launched
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until 1996 (Proctor, 1992). A combination of budget
shortfalls, sensor, and integration difficulties are
responsible for the ADEOS launch delay. Negotiations with
international space agencies have also slowed the progress
(Proctor, 1992). ADEOS will carry multiple earth and
oceanographic instruments sponsored by not only Japan, but
also by the U. S. and France (Hatoyama-Machi , 1990). The
U. S., specifically NASA, will contribute two sensors, while
France will contribute one (Hatoyama-Machi, 1990)
.
A key factor in Japanese space growth is in the increasing
symbiotic relationship between Japan's major space contractors
and the space agencies. This relationship has the potential
to create a powerful Japanese global space marketing and
development capability for the 21st century. Japan's space
contractors have become a powerful force with political clout
and they also help generate new space system users. (Tokyo,
1990)
Japan believes that the commercialization of remote
sensing satellites is premature and it is unclear if Japan
intends to sell MSI data on the commercial market. Japan's
main purpose for utilizing remote sensing is to develop
technology for potential future commercial systems and to
provide the data for users who intend to use it for the
benefit of the public (Radzanowski , 1991).
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D. EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY (ESA)
The ESA's Earth Remote Sensing Satellite (ERS-1) was
placed into orbit, after a 75-day delay for booster repairs,
on 16 July 1991 (Mecham, 22 July 1991) . The ERS-1 has both
scientific and commercial objectives and will monitor, among
other things, the world's oceans and land usage changes
(Radzanowski , 1991) . The greatest use of ERS-1 is expected to
be the day-night, all-weather imaging capabilities provided by
its side-scanning SAR radar (Mecham, 22 July 1991) . The
expected life span of ERS-1 is two to three years, with the
limiting factor being advanced technology components (Mecham,
13 July 1992) .
An industry consortium led by Radarsat International of
Canada, and including Spot Image and the Italian firm
Eurimage, will all market the data from ERS-1 commercially
(Radzanowski, 1991) .
ERS-2 is expected to be launched in December 1994 with an
instrument package similar to ERS-1 (Mecham, 13 July, 1992).
In Torrejon, Spain, the Western European Union (WEU) is
planning to open a satellite data military intelligence center
in October 1992 ("Center Puts WEU Closer...", 1992). The
facility will be directed by a United Kingdom official for
three years ("Satellite Base...", 1991). The center is part
of the WEU ' s goal to set up a European agency to verify arms
agreements by satellite, and will receive data from the U. S.
Landsat, French Spot and ESA's ERS-1 satellites and analyze it
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for military purposes ("Center Puts WEU Closer...", 1992).
The WEU will also use this imagery data to build expertise
among WEU member nations (" Satellite Base ..." , 1991). The WEU
Assembly has urged the European Agency to establish closer
relations with other European space and technology
organizations as part of that goal ("Center Puts WEU
Closer. . . " , 1992) .
E . CANADA
Scheduled for launch in 1994, Canada's remote sensing
satellite, Radarsat, is being designed to use a SAP, that can
be moved and refocused to provide different angles of viewing,
resolution, and size of images. This satellite is being
designed for operational use instead of being experimental and
the data will be sold commercially on the world market
(Radzanowski, 1991) .
F. INDIA
On August 29, 1991, the FSU launched the Indian remote
sensing satellite (IRS-1B) . The IRS-1B carries two
instruments, the Linear Imaging Self Scanner (LISS) sensors-
I and -II. One scanner has 72-meter spatial resolution, while
the other has 32-meter resolution, and they both gather data
in four spectral bands. IRS-1A was launched in 1988, and its
data was collected exclusively by Indian ground stations.
Data from IRS-1B may be directly available to international
78
ground stations for commercial purposes. India currently




The crisis that faces U. S. MSI capabilities must be
curbed. From its first use by NASA and DOI to its present day
use by the U. S. military, MSI land remote sensing has gained
steadily such importance that MSI information and data is now
an essential tool for military operations. Landsat and Spot
proved their great value in support of U. S. and allied troops
during Operations Desert Shield/Storm and now many other
countries have realized the importance of MSI and the data
that can be gleaned from it
.
To ensure that the U. S. continues to maintain the lead in
MSI capabilities, not only technologically but also




) Increase awareness of MSI capabilities to Fleet and
Fleet Marine Forces users - Lack of knowledge of MSI is the
biggest obstacle to overcome in the effective use of MSI to
support U. S. naval operations. To counter this extensive
training and awareness must begin at the top to ensure that
commanders know what is available to their intelligence
officers and planners. Past and current studies by DOD, and
the naval service in particular, substantiate the requirement
for MSI data in support of operations. DOD, possibly through
the Central Imagery Office as well as from NAVSPACECOM DET,
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must ensure that awareness of MSI capabilities is expanded
significantly
.
2.) Timely dissemination of MSI data to the user - The
second major problem with current MSI data is the lack of
timeliness in support of operations. During Desert
Shield/Storm EOSAT and Spot Image put forth great effort to
ensure the most rapid dissemination of data to U. S. and
allied forces. However, a more rapid dissemination of MSI
data is required if MSI is to be incorporated into near-real
time operational planning. For long term planning, such as
the six months available to prepare for the Gulf War,
timeliness of MSI data was not as great a factor. In
contrast, U. S. forces likely will require immediate
information in future operations. DOD must also develop a
rapid dissemination capability to ensure MSI data is
disseminated to deployed forces in near-real time.
3.) In-depth training of users - Lack of trained
personnel to analyze and disseminate MSI data is another
reason why MSI data has not been incorporated more rapidly in
planning and intelligence. Formal training, vice on-the-job
training would be preferred, but any training is better than
none at all. An extensive joint training program between
NAVSPACECOM DET and the Defense Mapping School, is suggested
for in-depth training.
Initiative and curiosity are the reasons that
FICPAC happened to have the ability to support naval forces
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with MSI during Desert Storm. The Marine Gunnery Sergeant,
who took it upon himself to use MSI in support of U. S.
forces, did so on his own initiative. This and his curiosity
about how the system worked drove him to investigate the use
of MSI prior to Iraq invading Kuwait and therefore, he was
ready to utilize the MSI processing system before Operation
Desert Shield. The U. S. cannot rely solely on initiative
such as this, we must require trained personnel to analyze MSI
data in the future.
4.) Operational Security (OPSEC) - The U. S. must realize
that the availability of MSI data commercially world-wide
introduces a leveling of the battlefield. We need especially
to guard against third world countries and their potential use
of MSI in surprising U. S. forces. The possible use of MSI
data by non-state actors such as terrorists and drug cartels,
with money to buy data must also be guarded against
.
5.) Over-reliance on foreign systems for MSI support to
U. S. forces - The U. S. cannot rely on foreign MSI data, as
that support may not always be available to us in future
situations. While we should cooperate with our friends and
allies in sharing data, as was done during Desert
Shield/Storm, we should not rely solely on them. This
reliability could lead to disaster in future operations if
data is unavailable.
By meeting the above requirements the U. S. will continue
to be the leader in MSI capabilities. Our use and analysis of
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MSI must be superior to that of our potential adversaries.
With the proliferation of MSI land remote sensing systems,
this is the only way that the U. S. can maintain its lead in
MSI capabilities.
If DOD ' s rapidly diminishing forces are to adequately
respond to the Nation's strategic and tactical needs in a
dramatically dynamic world of change, we must not overlook the
potential leverage that MSI land remote sensing capabilities
could offer in bringing this awesome challenge into sharper
focus
.





Were you previously aware of Multispectral Imagery (MSI)
capabilities and implications? Yes No
In what areas of planning would you like to see a more
extensive use of MSI? What would you like MSI to do for you?
Targeting intelligence? Indications and Warning?
What level of distribution of MSI products or information
would be desirable? Fleet Command Staff? Individual ships or
squadrons?
What are your Operational Security concerns if a potential
enemy can access and exploit information from the commercially
available MSI products?
What would you consider to be optimum timeliness in
receiving MSI products? Monthly updates? Daily updates?
Contingency driven updates?
Addi t iona 1 comment s / recommenda t i ons ?
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APPENDIX B - LANDSAT SPACECRAFT DATA SHEET
Landsats 1. 2. and 3
Orbit and Coverage:
Orbital Altitude: 920 km (570 mil
T>pe: Circular. sun-s\nchronous
One orbit every 103 minutes i 14 per day)
Equatorial crowing time:
• Landsat 1. 8:50 a.m.
• Landsat 1 ^-08 a.m.
• Landsat 3. 9:51 xm.
Repeat coverage ai Equator 18 days
Inclination: 99 decrees
Sensor Packages:




Height: 3 m i 10 It)
Diameter: 1.5 m (5 ft)
Solar panels extend to 4 m ( 13 ft)
Launch Dates & Satellite Life:
Landsat 1 - July 1972 to January 1978
Landsat 2 - Januarv 1975 to Februarv 1982
Landsat 3 - March' 1 978 to March 1983
Landsats 4 and 5
Orbit and Coverage:
Orbital Altitude: "05 km (438 mil
T>pe: Circular, sun-synchronous
One orbit every 98.9 minutes 1 14 per day)
Equatorial crossing time: 9:45 xm.
Repeat Coverage at Equator. 16 days
Inclination: 98.2 degrees
Sensor Packages:
Multi-Spectral Scanner ( MSS >
Thematic Mapper (TM)
Spacecraft Dimensions:
Weight: 2200 kg (48U0 lbs)
Leneih: 4 m i 14 tt>
Widm: 2 m (7 ft)
Height high-gain antenna: 3.7 m ( 12.5 ft)
Launch Dates & Satellite Life:
Landsat 4 - July 16. 1982 to present
Landsat 5 - March I. 1984 to present
I
Based on a Multi-Mission Modular spacecraft. Landsats 4 and 5 added communications relay systems to interface with the
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System lTDRSSi.
Landsat 6 is based on ihe Advanced TIROS-N series <>t polar-orbiting
satellites, designed by General Electric \ Astro Space Division. It will be the
largest ol the Landsat series, carrying the Enhanced Thematic Mapper (ETM)
built by Hughes Santa Barbara Research Center, and wide-band tape record-
ers. The orbit characteristics are identical to those ot Landsats 4 and 5.
Continuity with Landsat 4 and 5 Thematic Mapper data will be assured.
NOTE SPA.c1.r2n jre *n.mn ji reuuve m/c> anu s^jico l
Landsat 6
Orbit and Coverage:
Orbital Altitude: "05 km (438 mi.)
Type: Circular, sun-synchronous
One orbit even.' ^8.9 minutes ( 1 4 per day
)
Equatorial crossing time: 9:45 a.m.
Repeal coverage at Equator: 16 days
Inclination: 98.2 degrees
Sensor Package:
Enhanced Thematic Mapper (ETM)
Spacecraft Dimensions:
Weight: 2700 kg (6000 lbs
»
Height: 4 m ( 14 ft)
Width: 2 in (7 It I
Launch Date: Mid 19^2
i,«h humjn njurc
APPENDIX C - GROUND RECEIVING STATIONS FOR LANDSATS-4 AND -5
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